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Problem definition: A large proportion of the world’s population has no access to electricity and so relies on noxious
kerosene for their lighting needs. Solar-based solutions require a large upfront investment and are often unaffordable
in this market owing to consumers’ tight liquidity constraints. As an alternative, there are business models relying
on rechargeable light bulbs that are sold at a subsidized price (which renders them affordable) and require regular
micropayments for recharges (which eases liquidity constraints). These bulbs provide a cheaper and healthier light
source than kerosene, yet their adoption is lower than expected and some consumers continue to use kerosene. This
paper explores the potential drivers of such preferences and proposes strategies to alter them, thereby benefiting firms,
consumers, and the environment.
Academic Relevance: Unlike most of the existing operations management literature which focuses on the problems
in developed economies, our paper studies a problem specific to the poor population. Our novel modeling approach,
which incorporates several operational features of the impoverished regions, could also serve as a template for other
potential modeling attempts in similar settings.
Methodology: We propose a stylized consumer behavior model that accounts for – in addition to the monetary cost
incurred while using a particular light source – the inconvenience cost (due to repeated travel to the purchase center)
and blackout cost (due to liquidity constraints) associated with that source, to explain the consumer preference for
kerosene and to recommend strategies that could mitigate that preference.
Results: Although kerosene lighting is more expensive than bulbs, consumers who face either high inconvenience
costs or high blackout costs prefer kerosene to bulbs because the former’s flexibility, with regard to quantity, helps
reduce whichever cost is dominating. At the firm level, there is an optimal bulb capacity and recharge price pair
that maximizes the firm’s revenue; furthermore, firm can reverse the preferences of kerosene consumers by increasing
the flexibility of the bulbs (e.g., by allowing partial recharges). Although strategies – such as price discounts and
mobile micropayments – based on alleviating liquidity constraints are not in themselves sufficient to ensure higher
adoption rates, increased bulb use becomes more likely when they are combined with strategies to reduce consumers’
inconvenience.
Managerial Implications: Our paper sheds light on the structure of the market in which firms operate by identifying
the characteristics of the market segments that prefer kerosene. It also helps the firms make better decisions by
evaluating the efficacy of several strategies in terms of increasing the adoption of bulbs.
1. Introduction
It is a disturbing fact that nearly a fifth of humankind still does not have access to electricity (IEA
2015). More than 95% of this population inhabits countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and developing
Asia. Not surprisingly, countries with low electrification rates are those in which most citizens live
on less than $2 (US) per day (IEA 2015). This part of the world’s population is often referred to
as the bottom of the pyramid (BoP).
Grid-based models of electricity supply, which are those most often used to serve the top of
the pyramid, have been unsuccessful in these countries because they require substantial capital
investment. About 80% of the world’s off-grid population resides in rural areas (IEA 2015). Because
households in villages are often scattered, it may neither be technically feasible nor economical to
extend grid electricity to these regions (IFC 2010). Even in the electrified parts of these countries,
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poor households either are not connected to the grid (because of high connection fees) or are
supplied with low-quality light with frequent power outages (IFC 2010). Hence there is a huge
market for off-grid energy in these countries.
Poor households spend an estimated $18 billion each year on low-quality off-grid lighting solu-
tions – this represents an appreciable fraction (up to 10%) of their monthly expenditures. Most
of this expenditure goes toward kerosene which remains to be the predominant source of off-grid
lighting (IFC 2012a).1 In addition to its high costs, kerosene poses great fire and health hazards.
This highly flammable liquid releases millions of tons of carbon dioxide annually and is responsible
for 2 million deaths each year – more than the number due to malaria. Home solar systems (i.e.,
solar panels sold with modular products such as lamps and plugs) offer a clean source of light;
yet each system costs more than $100, placing solar energy well beyond the reach of people at the
BoP (IFC 2010). In addition to home systems, firms such as d.light2 and Onergy3 sell cheaper,
portable solar bulbs (with self-sufficient solar panels) costing from $10 to $50. However, these are
also unaffordable to the poor because of their extremely low income levels and near total lack of
access to efficient mechanisms for saving and borrowing (IFC 2010).
Prahalad (2006) argues that effectively serving such a liquidity-constrained market will require
innovative and fundamentally different business models at the BoP. For example, fast-moving con-
sumer goods (FMCG) companies such as Unilever and P&G have adapted some of their products
for the BoP market by repackaging goods in smaller volumes to make them more affordable (Praha-
lad 2006). The equivalent of this model for delivering light is rechargeable bulb technology.4 Instead
of selling rechargeable bulbs to consumers at full price, firms can either rent them or sell them at
a subsidized price. Nuru Energy5 in Rwanda uses this business model to sell off-grid light to its
consumers. Although each bulb costs Nuru $6, it is sold at a subsidized price of $1.50. Continued
use of such bulbs requires that they be recharged at a (usually village-level) recharge center for a
small recharging fee of $0.20; each recharge lasts for 18 hours. Nuru employs an entrepreneur at the
center who recharges bulbs by pedaling a stationary bicycle, the so-called PowerCycle generator,
that can fully recharge five bulbs with 20 minutes of pedaling (Carrick and Santos 2013). The
1 Many households at the BoP do not use kerosene for their cooking or heating needs because it is too expensive for
these purposes. Instead, they use firewood and charcoal for cooking and heating on inefficient stoves and fireplaces
(IFC 2012a).
2 http://www.dlight.com/
3 http://onergy.in/
4 Light sources powered by replaceable batteries (e.g., torches) can also provide light to consumers in small portions,
but they usually cost consumers more than do rechargeable versions. Moreover, as argued by Bensch et al. (2015),
the improper disposal of replaced batteries in rural areas degrades the environment and threatens the health of those
living there. Although our model and insights can be extended to these sources, they are not discussed in this paper.
5 http://nuruenergy.com/
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revenue stream from repeated recharges makes it possible for the firm to subsidize the upfront price
by financing it through ongoing payments. There are other companies, such as Sunlabob in Laos
and Shidhulai in Bangladesh,6 which use a similar business model to deliver off-grid light to BoP
consumers. Some of these companies rely exclusively on solar-based technologies for recharging,
which take 1–2 hours to recharge a bulb.
Because rechargeable bulbs are sold at a low (subsidized) price, upfront technology cost is unlikely
to be a barrier to adoption. At the same time, extremely affordable micropayments for recharges
help consumers overcome their liquidity constraints. These bulbs provide clean and smoke-free
light. Selling hours of light instead of the equipment that produces it resembles the pay-per-use
service provided by a grid connection, so this business model brings to consumers the advantages
of electric lighting. Most firms that market rechargeable bulbs price their recharges so that the
technology costs consumers much less than using kerosene. For instance, 100 ml of kerosene costs
$0.20 in Rwanda and produces close to six hours of light. Thus, with Nuru’s recharge price, bulbs
are 3 times cheaper than kerosene.7
These features of rechargeable light bulbs lead one to suppose that most of the BoP population
would prefer them to other, costlier sources of light and hence that these bulbs would displace
kerosene. However, this is not always the case; kerosene is still prevalent in regions where recharge-
able bulbs are available. For instance, the number of purchases of Nuru bulbs is high (about 67%,
according to a pilot study in Rwanda; Beuggert 2014) thanks to subsidized prices, but the true
adoption rate (i.e., the actual usage) is lower than anticipated – as reflected in the low recharge
frequencies (only 1.2–1.6 times per month, on average; Beuggert 2014). Some villagers continue
to use kerosene even though it costs significantly more (Beuggert 2014), which seems to be an
economically irrational preference.
In this paper, we explore the potential drivers of such preferences and propose strategies to
alter them. Understanding the drivers of consumer preferences is of utmost importance because
it can lead to better business models and product designs, which in turn should result in higher
adoption rates and less use of kerosene. These outcomes would benefit firms, consumers, and the
environment.
6 Sunlabob (http://www.sunlabob.com/) rents solar bulbs to its consumers in Laos. It assesses a fee of $0.12 for
each recharge, which lasts for 10 hours. In Bangladesh, Shidhulai (http://www.shidhulai.org/afftechnology.html)
retrofits hurricane lamps with LED bulbs that can be recharged at a solar recharge center. Shidhulai’s lamps are sold
for $3 to consumers who bring their own kerosene lamps to be retrofitted; otherwise the charge is $4. Each lamp
recharge lasts for 8 hours and costs $0.07. The price and bulb capacity details for the examples here are taken from
http://energymap-scu.org/. Most of these companies design their bulbs in such a way that those bulbs can only be
recharged by their proprietary technology.
7 Here we are quoting the price of kerosene in Rwanda’s urban areas. But since prices in rural areas are generally
higher (IFC 2012b), the cost saving we report is a conservative estimate.
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Broadly, the paper is divided into two parts, one that describes consumer behavior and the second
that provides prescriptions for the firm. In the first part of the paper (Sections 3 and 4) we build a
stylized model to characterize consumer preference for kerosene and bulbs. This model accounts for
three aspects that are key to light consumption under poverty: (i) procurement dynamics, which are
driven by the necessity to purchase light (in the form of kerosene or bulb recharges); (ii) repeated
purchases, which entail inconvenience for consumers who must periodically replenish their light
supply; and (iii) liquidity constraints, which can lead to periods during which the consumer has
no access to light. These features lead to three types of consumer costs – the monetary cost, the
inconvenience cost, and the blackout cost. The overall cost incurred by a consumer is the sum of
these three costs. We assume that the consumer prefers the light source associated with the lowest
long-run average overall cost. We find that not all of these BoP consumers prefer bulbs despite the
lower monetary cost of recharging as compared with purchasing kerosene. In our model, consumers
whose inconvenience costs are high relative to their blackout costs are referred to as inconvenience-
averse consumers; analogously, those with high blackout costs relative to inconvenience costs we
call blackout-averse consumers. Both these consumer types prefer kerosene to bulbs because of
its flexible nature: kerosene can be procured in any quantity whereas bulbs have a fixed recharge
capacity. That flexibility allows inconvenience-averse (resp. blackout-averse) consumers to purchase
in large (resp. small) quantities, helping them save on their long-run inconvenience (resp. blackout)
cost. The derived preference structure is robust to several assumptions made in our model.
In the second, prescriptive part of the paper (Section 5) we discuss several strategies to increase
both the adoption rate of bulbs and the revenue of firms operating those bulbs. These strategies
are built on the consumer cost and preference structure analysis from the first part. Because some
market segments prefer the flexibility of kerosene, as just described, the firm could gain consumers
from those segments by making its bulb technology more flexible. That could be achieved by scaling
up bulb capacity while allowing consumers to recharge them only partially. We also quantify the
long-run demand for the bulbs and revenue of the firm, and identify the optimal bulb capacity
and recharge price that maximize the firm’s revenue. We find that the strategies that alleviate
consumers’ liquidity constraints (such as price discounts, subsidies, and mobile micropayments)
reduce blackouts. Yet they may not always result in higher adoption rates, since these strategies
lead to increased recharge frequency and thus to more consumer inconvenience in the long run;
thus their overall effect on consumer costs, and hence on bulb adoption, is ambiguous. That being
said, liquidity-oriented strategies are likely to improve adoption when they are combined with
strategies designed to reduce inconvenience by, for example, offering door-to-door recharge service
or increasing the number of recharge centers.
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Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we present a novel model of the off-grid con-
sumption of light in impoverished regions. It is a simple model that nonetheless accounts for several
important operational features: liquidity constraints, consumer inconvenience, and technology flex-
ibility. Hence this model could serve as a template for future research in contexts involving similar
trade-offs. Second, our analysis offers a plausible explanation for why people may prefer a tech-
nology, such as kerosene, that is both inferior to and more expensive than the alternative (here,
rechargeable bulbs). Although that preference could be plausibly explained in other ways – for
example, by habit formation or as a lack of trust in new technology – we are not aware of any
research that incorporates, as we do here, the flexibility and convenience of kerosene. Finally, we
operationalize the preference structure of consumers toward the end of evaluating strategies that
firms could implement to increase the adoption of rechargeable off-grid technologies.
2. Literature Review
Our paper is positioned at the intersection of two streams of literature: sustainable operations and
the economics of poverty.
The challenges of devising sustainable business models are discussed extensively in Kleindorfer
et al. (2005), Drake and Spinler (2013), Girotra and Netessine (2013), and Plambeck (2013). A
number of studies have analyzed the effect of operational decisions and business models on the
environment in a variety of contexts, including supply chains (Cachon 2014, Plambeck and Taylor
2016, Vedantam et al. 2016), choice of revenue models (Agrawal et al. 2012, Belavina et al. 2016),
product designs (Plambeck and Wang 2009, Raz et al. 2013), and fleet operations (Chocteau et al.
2011, Kleindorfer et al. 2012). Our paper is directly related to the growing body of research on
sustainable energy-related business models, a literature that spans several areas: the adoption of
electric vehicles (Avci et al. 2015, Lim et al. 2015), the effect of energy policies on supply and
demand in electricity markets (Daniels and Lobel 2014, Sunar and Birge 2015), the pricing of
renewable energy sources (Alizamir et al. 2016, Kok et al. 2016), and the adoption of “green”
technologies (Lobel and Perakis 2011, Krass et al. 2013, Cohen et al. 2016, Aflaki and Netessine
2017). Much as in these papers, the focus of our research is on understanding how the firm’s
decisions can affect adoption of a clean energy technology. Yet our paper differs from those just
cited because the context we investigate is the bottom of the pyramid – a market with unique
consumer characteristics and adoption challenges.
With regard to understanding the drivers of technology adoption in the context of poverty, our
paper is also related to the behavioral economics literature. Some examples from this research
stream are Cohen and Dupas (2010), who study the adoption of insecticide-treated bed nets, and
Dupas (2014), who studies the effect of short-term subsidies on the long-term adoption of those
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bed nets. Also, Ashraf et al. (2010) explore how price affects the use of water purification solutions,
Devoto et al. (2012) examine what drives the adoption of piped water connections, and Hanna
et al. (2012) seek to explain the low adoption rates of eco-friendly cooking stoves; Dercon and
Christiaensen (2011) identify factors that discourage the application of fertilizers, and Duflo et al.
(2011) propose nudges to increase the use of fertilizers. In addition to this rich vein of research
papers, several books have been published on the topic. Collins et al. (2009) explain the saving
and expenditure patterns of the world’s poor, Karlan and Appel (2011) investigate why seemingly
beneficial policies often do not have a positive effect on the lives of impoverished populations,
and Banerjee and Duflo (2011) critically analyze the decision making of poor people in several
contexts. Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) use the notion of scarcity to frame both the behavior of
busy people (who lack time) and the behavior of poor people (who lack money).
Much of the theoretical work in the economics of poverty literature focuses on the interaction
between poverty and behavior. For example, Banerjee and Newman (1994) explain poverty traps
using a model of desperation (based on the premise that that the poor have too little to lose), and
Banerjee (2000) compares this model with the model of vulnerability (based on the premise that
the poor are afraid of any losses because losses cause them too much pain), and discusses policy
implications. Banerjee and Mullainathan (2008) propose a model where individuals have limited
attention, and find that poverty can over-occupy one’s attention resulting in worse performance.
Banerjee and Mullainathan (2010) explain several puzzling facts about the poor using a model of
temptation goods which generate a positive utility for the self that consumes them, but not for
any previous self that anticipates their consumption. In contrast to these models which are usually
agnostic to the context, we build a model specific to the context of light consumption under poverty
which incorporates several operational underpinnings of the consumer behavior. To the best of
our knowledge, we are the first ones to build such a model, and as we shall see, the incorporated
operational features play an important role in explaining the observed behavior.
3. Consumer Model
In this section, we begin by listing the features that are arguably the most important for consumer
preferences in the context of light consumption under poverty; we then build models which account
for these features.
First, consumers in our model are typically villagers, living in poor countries, whose main occu-
pation is subsistence farming. Most of these consumers live on an extremely low income (less than
$2 per day) and have no access to efficient saving and borrowing mechanisms (IEA 2015). More-
over, on a daily basis they juggle dealing with a variety of needs, both expected and unexpected;
some of those needs – such as food and health – receive higher priority than light. These charac-
teristics severely constrain the cash available for purchasing light. Given such liquidity constraints,
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consumers who want to purchase light may be unable to afford doing so. In such cases they must
wait for sufficient money to accrue, during which time they do not have light and so suffer from
blackouts. Thus liquidity constraints (and the resulting blackouts) are an important factor affecting
impoverished consumers’ preferences for light consumption.
Second, the sources of light considered in this paper require repeated purchases. In particular,
consumers must either recharge their bulbs at a recharging center or buy kerosene from a nearby
store. Few villages have more than one or two kerosene stores, and there is usually only just a
single recharging center. The villages in East African countries, for example, are spread over hills
and typically have neither efficient public transportation nor even well-laid roads for walking. So
for some consumers, purchasing light involves the physically demanding task of hill climbing, and a
round trip can take longer than two hours (IFC 2010). Since many villagers work as daily labor on
farms owned by others, the time required to purchase light is a significant inconvenience – another
crucial factor in the context of repeated light purchases.
The third key feature of this market is that, as a source of light, kerosene differs markedly from
bulbs. The light from bulbs is white, smoke-free, and focused; in contrast, kerosene produces a yel-
low, smoky, and diffuse light. More importantly, kerosene is a liquid – and thus a flexible resource –
that can be bought in almost any quantity, whereas bulbs have a fixed capacity. The former aspects
characterize the quality of light whereas the latter characterizes the quantity of light purchased,
which reflects the amount of money spent to purchase that light. These inherent differences between
the two light sources are likely to play an important role in determining consumer preferences. In
the lives of poor populations, the constraints due to lack of funds are more binding than those due
to quality considerations; for this reason, our consumer model accounts only for quantity flexibility.
Note that incorporating quality preferences, although easy enough to do, would yield self-evidently
trivial results.
If we define a cycle as the duration between two purchases, then each such cycle involves the
purchase of light, the consumption of that light, and making the next purchase – possibly after
waiting until sufficient funds have accrued. When these factors are considered, we can identify three
types of consumer costs as follows: the monetary cost of purchasing light, the inconvenience cost
associated with the need to replenish the light supply, and the blackout cost due to the disutility
incurred when needed light is unavailable because of liquidity constraints. The overall cost that
the consumer incurs in a cycle is the sum of these three costs.
Since the purchase of light is cyclic and since the consumer incurs a finite cost in each cycle, we
believe that the most suitable metric for evaluating a light source is the long-run cost incurred by
the users of that source. Thus we assume that our consumer is a “long-run–average cost minimizer”.
In what follows, we devise a model that incorporates the features just described and thereby
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characterize long-run costs. We remark that the technology acquisition cost (i.e., the purchase price
of a rechargeable bulb or a kerosene lamp) is not considered here because that cost is unlikely to
hinder adoption: households typically own a kerosene lamp (IFC 2010), and the subsidized upfront
price of bulbs makes their purchase affordable to most (Beuggert 2014). Furthermore, since our
analysis concerns costs incurred in the long-run, these one-time initial costs get washed out in such
setting and hence have a trivial impact.
3.1. Consumption of Light: Bulbs
Let P be the recharge price and let Q be the rechargeable bulb’s capacity. After each recharge,
we assume that the light is consumed at a constant rate of λ hours per day. This assumption is
reasonable because the need for light is almost deterministic: about three to four hours in the late
evening and night. Hence a bulb runs through its charge (i.e., becomes “discharged”) in Q/λ days,
as shown in Figure 1. We refer to this duration as the bulb’s consumption time.


Stochastic Income Modified v2
Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3
BlackoutBlackout/
Figure 1 Consumption cycles (upper graph) and income cycles (lower graph). The consumer has sufficient
money when the bulb is discharged in cycle 1 but not in cycles 2 and 3. Hence the consumer does not experience
any blackouts in cycle 1 but does experience blackouts, of uncertain duration, in cycles 2 and 3.
When the bulb is discharged, if the consumer can afford the next recharge (as in cycle 1 of
Figure 1) then recharging proceeds without delay. (The consequences of accounting for delays in
purchases is discussed in Section 4.) However, liquidity constraints may be such that the consumer
cannot afford recharging when the bulb is discharged (as in cycles 2 and 3 of Figure 1). In that case,
the consumer must wait for sufficient money to accrue before recharging and therefore experiences
blackouts during the interim.
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3.1.1. Modeling Liquidity Constraints and Blackouts. The time spent waiting for
the next recharge is tied directly to the consumer’s cash in hand that can be spent on light, so
characterizing this duration requires that we model her income process. Because earned income is
used for a variety of needs (food, health, education, etc.), some of which may be of higher priority
than the need for light, we assume that the consumer uses “mental accounting” (Thaler 1985) to
manage her overall income where she has separate accounts for each of her important needs. There
is substantial evidence from the literature on psychology and experimental economics that people
have a strong tendency to budget portions of their overall income into separate accounts and then
to track their expenses against those budgets (see e.g. Henderson and Peterson 1992, Heath and
Soll 1996, Thaler 1999). For the purposes of our paper, the only such account of interest is the one
dedicated to acquiring light; the income entering this account is that part of the consumer’s total
income that can be spent on light.
For the purpose of illustration, we could also think of mental account for light as a savings box
used by the consumer to save money for purchasing light. After every purchase, we assume that the
money in this box is reset to zero and the process begins anew (as shown in Figure 1); therefore,
at no time will the consumer have saved more than P dollars for light. Heath and Soll (1996) use
several experiments to show that people set such maximum limits/budgets across categories of
expenses in advance of actual consumption, and they usually adhere to these pre-set budgets and
resist transferring money across accounts. Furthermore, Thaler (1999) argues that “the tighter the
budget, the more explicit are the budgeting rules, both in households and organizations. Families
living near the poverty level use strict, explicit budgets” (p. 193). We therefore expect these mental
accounts to be quite inflexible in the current context.8
The simplest income model presumes that the consumer adds µ dollars every day to this mental
account/savings box. Under that deterministic model, P/µ days are required for the consumer to
accrue enough money for a recharge. We call this the hitting time, i.e., the time required by a
income process to “hit” the threshold P . If the hitting time P/µ is shorter than the consumption
time Q/λ, then the consumer always has enough money to replenish a discharged bulb and so does
not experience any blackouts. But when the hitting time is longer than the consumption time, the
consumer experiences blackouts that last P/µ−Q/λ days.
Since the consumer’s needs and also her overall income are uncertain, it is unlikely that her
disposable income for light actually grows at a constant rate. In other words: instead of adding
µ dollars every day to the savings box, the consumer adds an uncertain amount that could be less or
greater than µ depending on her daily needs and income. As evident from the deterministic model,
8 As we shall see shortly, although the mental accounting model assumed here simplifies the analysis, it does not drive
any of our main results.
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we require only the hitting time to characterize blackout duration. The traditional approach to
modeling hitting time is to first model income as a standard stochastic process and then characterize
the associated hitting time. For example, if income were modeled as a Brownian motion then
its hitting time is inverse Gaussian distributed (Johnson et al. 1995). However, Brownian motion
can take negative values and so using it to model income leads to several unrealistic results.9
Alternately, we could model income as a process that takes only positive values such as reflected
Brownian motion, Gamma process, etc. But these processes have intractable hitting times which
complicates the analysis.
Since we need only the hitting time of the income process to model consumer purchase behavior,
instead of modeling income explicitly, we offer a simple model of the hitting time. Recall that the
hitting time is P/µ days in the deterministic case but that, when income is uncertain, it could
take either a longer or a shorter time than P/µ days to hit the threshold P . We represent this
randomness using a positive random variable ε˜ and model the hitting time as
τ˜(P ) =
P
µ
ε˜, (1)
where P/µ is the deterministic hitting time and ε˜ is the randomness associated with that hitting
time. Since ε˜ could be any positive random variable (with finite expectation), we believe that our
hitting time model is quite general. Although it is not necessary, we could normalize the mean of
ε˜ to 1 to be consistent with the deterministic model. In this setup, the variance of ε˜ captures the
magnitude of uncertainty in a consumer’s life. Since ε˜ is always positive, it follows that τ˜(P ) is also
positive and that τ˜(0) = 0 almost surely – that is, no time is needed to hit a threshold when it is
the same as the starting point. Throughout this paper we denote the probability density function
(PDF) of ε˜ by f , and its cumulative distribution function (CDF) by F .10
Under this hitting-time model, the duration of blackouts can be written simply as [τ˜(P )−Q/λ]+;
here [z]+ denotes the positive part of z.
3.1.2. Modeling Long-Run Consumer Costs. Next we construct the long-run average
consumer cost C associated with using bulbs. Recall from Figure 1 that consumption cycles are
aligned with income cycles and that both renew after every purchase. Thus we have perfect renewals
and so can use Wald’s theory (Ross 1996) to compute the long-run average cost, which is simply
the ratio of expected cost during a cycle to that cycle’s expected length. We now characterize each
9 The analysis based on Brownian motion is available from the authors upon request.
10 We also considered the hitting time model with an additive shock, i.e., τ˜(P ) = P/µ+ ε˜. Because of the lack of
interaction between the threshold to be hit and the shock, this model has several undesirable properties (e.g., τ˜(0) = ε˜
which could be non-zero, and Var[τ˜(P )] = Var[ε˜] which is independent of P ). It also complicates the analysis, and
the resulting insights are similar to the ones we obtain with the multiplicative shock model in the paper.
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of these two components. Our hitting-time model implies that the expected blackout duration L
is given by
L=E[P ε˜/µ−Q/λ]+. (2)
The expected cycle length Ψ is then the sum of consumption time and expected blackout duration:
Ψ =Q/λ+L. (3)
As discussed previously, the consumer’s expected cost in a cycle comprises three components:
expected monetary, inconvenience, and blackout costs. The monetary cost in a cycle is simply the
amount P paid by a consumer for a recharge. Although there are various forms of inconvenience
incurred by consumers seeking to recharge their bulbs, we collapse all of them into a single param-
eter I; this inconvenience level is the “dollar equivalent” of the inconvenience that the consumer
incurs.
To model blackout cost, we assume that if the consumer experiences z consecutive days of
blackouts then the corresponding blackout cost is βb(z). Here b is the blackout function, which
is increasing, twice differentiable, and strictly convex with b(0) = 0; the term β captures the
consumer’s sensitivity to blackouts and serves also to convert experienced blackouts to dollars.
The strict convexity of b means, for example, that experiencing six consecutive days of blackouts
is costlier to a consumer than experiencing three consecutive days of blackouts on two differ-
ent occasions. To establish boundary conditions for some of our results, we further assume that
limz→∞ b(z) = limz→∞ b′(z) = limz→∞ zb′(z)− b(z) =∞. These conditions reflect the increasing dis-
comfort of extended blackouts and so ensure that consumers prefer some light source to having no
light at all. Thus the expected blackout cost is given by βB, where
B =Eb[P ε˜/µ−Q/λ]+. (4)
The following lemma lists some intuitive properties of L, B, and Ψ that will be useful in proving
the results to follow.
Lemma 1. [Shapes of expected blackout duration, blackout cost, and cycle length]
(i) L and B are decreasing in bulb capacity Q, increasing in recharge price P, and decreasing in
the saving rate µ.
(ii) Ψ is increasing in both Q and P but is decreasing in µ.
When we combine all the costs discussed so far, the final expression for long-run average consumer
cost is written as
C =
Expected sum of inconvenience, monetary and blackout costs
Expected cycle length
=
I +P +βB
Ψ
. (5)
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We can summarize this development as follows. The assumed consumption and income processes
lead to perfect renewals, which enable an elegant characterization of the consumer’s long-run cost
of using bulbs. As evident from (5), long-run costs are both simple and tractable, which makes
them useful for the tasks that are more complex – namely, characterizing consumer preferences and
optimizing firm-level decisions. Moreover, unlike complex dynamic consumption models, making
decisions based on long-run costs does not require that the consumers have strong cognitive abilities.
Under our model, consumers need only estimate two simple numbers to compute the long-run
cost of using a light source: the (average) length of time between two purchases of light; and the
(average) cost incurred between two purchases.11
3.2. Consumption of Light: Kerosene
Let pk be the unit price of kerosene. To facilitate comparisons, we base our discussion on hours
of light. For example, if 100 ml of kerosene costs $0.20 and lasts about six hours, then pk = 0.033
dollars/hour. Unlike bulbs, kerosene offers consumers the flexibility of choosing the consumption
quantity Qk (hours of light). To keep the model simple, we assume that a consumer purchases the
same, but optimally chosen quantity Qk in every cycle (e.g., that a standard bottle is used for each
purchase). This assumption is not entirely realistic, however, since the consumer could vary her
purchase quantity across cycles depending on a variety of constraints. Yet we restrict our analysis
to this simple model for two reasons. First, if we can rationalize the seemingly irrational preference
for kerosene under this model, then a more complex model (that incorporates kerosene quantity
dynamics) can also rationalize this preference; thus the insights derived here would continue to
hold (at least as a special case) in a more complex setting. Second, we are interested in the effects
of flexibility in choosing a quantity and this simple model allows us to separate that factor from
the effects of quantity dynamics. It is trivial that the ability to vary the purchased quantity across
cycles drives consumers’ preference toward kerosene, so we do not include this feature in our model.
11 The analysis with expected total cost over a finite horizon [0, T ] is equivalent to the analysis with long-run average
cost if T is large enough such that one could apply the central limit theorem for renewal processes (e.g., T could
be around two years during which we can reasonably expect more than 30 purchases). We can model the number
of purchases (i.e., renewals) over [0, T ] as a counting process N˜(T ) with inter-renewal times as the independently
and identically distributed instances of random variable Ψ˜. Then the mean inter-renewal time is the expected cycle
length Ψ given by (3). The total inconvenience cost incurred over [0, T ] is IN˜(T ), and the total money paid is
PN˜(T ). The total blackout cost incurred over [0, T ] can be modeled as a renewal-reward process Ω˜(T ), where the
rewards are independent and identical instances of random variable βB˜. The expected reward in a cycle is equal to
βB which is given by (4). Then the total cost incurred over [0, T ] is equal to C˜(T ) = IN˜(T ) + PN˜(T ) + Ω˜(T ). If
T is large enough, then from Theorem 2.2.5 of Tijms (2003) we obtain N˜(T )∼Normal(T/Ψ, σ2ΨT/Ψ3) and Ω˜(T )∼
Normal
(
βBT/Ψ, β2σ2BT/Ψ
3
)
, where σ2Ψ = E[Ψ˜−Ψ]2 and σ2B = E[B˜Ψ− Ψ˜B]2. The expected total cost incurred over
[0, T ] is given by EC˜(T ) = IT/Ψ +PT/Ψ +βBT/Ψ = TC, where C is the long-run cost as defined by (5). Thus, the
length of the horizon T (when large enough) simply acts as a scaling factor and does not affect our insights.
Uppari, Popescu, and Netessine: Selling Off-Grid Light to Liquidity Constrained Consumers 13
Given these assumptions, we can readily use the framework just developed to characterize the
long-run consumer cost of using kerosene as follows:
Ck =
I + pkQk +βBk
Ψk
, (6)
where
Ψk =Qk/λ+E[pkQkε˜/µ−Qk/λ]+ ≡QkΨˆk and Bk =Eb[pkQkε˜/µ−Qk/λ]+. (7)
Because the consumer has the flexibility of choosing Qk, we assume that she chooses the quantity
that minimizes her long-run cost. Let that cost-minimizing quantity be Q∗k = arg minQk Ck and
let C∗k be the corresponding optimal cost. The following proposition establishes the existence and
uniqueness of Q∗k; it also characterizes the effects of inconvenience level and blackout sensitivity
on Q∗k, which will be useful when we analyze consumer preferences. Other than the constraint
that Qk be positive, the analysis here assumes no bounds on Qk. We discuss the consequences of
relaxing this possibly unrealistic assumption in Section 4.
Proposition 1. [Optimal kerosene purchase quantity]
(i) Ck is U-shaped in Qk with a unique minimum Q
∗
k.
(ii) The optimal kerosene quantity Q∗k is increasing in I but decreasing in β.
Let us now interpret these results. As the purchase quantity Qk increases, the consumer expe-
riences a lower inconvenience cost yet a higher blackout cost in the long run. At the same time,
the long-run monetary cost remains unaffected because pkQk/Ψk = pk/Ψˆk is independent of Qk
(by (7)). Thus the optimal purchase quantity Q∗k is obtained by balancing the marginal decrease
in long-run inconvenience cost against the marginal increase in long-run blackout cost.
We show that it is optimal for a consumer to purchase in large quantities if she faces high
inconvenience level (relative to her blackout sensitivity). This description would apply, for example,
to a consumer who resides far from the kerosene store and does not have a strong need for light. By
purchasing in large quantities at each visit, and thereby making fewer visits in the long run, this
consumer could save on her inconvenience cost and reduce her overall cost. Conversely, a consumer
who is highly sensitive to blackouts (relative to her inconvenience level) will find it optimal to
purchase in small quantities. This scenario would be embodied by a consumer who lives close to the
kerosene store and has children who must do their homework at night (or has cattle that must be
fed at night). For such a consumer, more frequent purchases of small quantities reduces blackouts
in the long run while lowering the overall cost. In the next section we shall see that this trade-
off – between inconvenience cost and blackout cost – plays a crucial role in determining consumer
preferences.
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4. Preference for Bulbs vs. Kerosene
Here we compare the consumer’s cost C of using bulbs with her optimal cost C∗k of using kerosene.
Before comparing these two costs, we discuss our assumptions on the constituent parameters. First,
we assume that the consumption rate λ and the income characteristics (µ and F ) do not differ
across the two light sources. Second, we assume that the consumer’s sensitivity to blackouts (β)
and the blackout function (b) are also the same for both sources; thus, blackouts due to discharged
light bulbs are no more or less painful than blackouts due to an unreplenished kerosene supply.
It may be that the inconvenience level I associated with using bulbs differs from that associated
with using kerosene (call it Ik). For example, if we consider the physical inconvenience of traveling
to the purchase center, then currently Ik tends (on average) to be less than I because a village
usually has more kerosene sellers than recharging centers. So all else held equal, reducing the
inconvenience level of bulbs reduces C and increases the preference for bulbs. Hence we ignore
these trivial differences and instead assume the same value of I for both bulbs and kerosene. We
shall establish that, even when the inconvenience level and blackout cost structure are the same
across these sources of light, consumers may still prefer one over the other (for the reasons we
explore next). This approach enables us to derive prescriptions for increasing the preference for
rechargeable light bulbs that go beyond merely suggesting that I be reduced.
For a given consumer, let
∆ =C −C∗k =
I +P +βB
Ψ
− I + pkQ
∗
k +βB
∗
k
Ψ∗k
(8)
be the difference between the long-run costs of bulbs and kerosene. Then the consumer prefers
bulbs (resp., kerosene) if ∆≤ 0 (resp., if ∆> 0).12 Our next result characterizes the shape of ∆ as
a function of the inconvenience level I.
Lemma 2. The difference ∆ is convex in I, and it has an interior minimum in (0,∞).
Figure 2 shows various shapes that ∆ could take as a function of I. If the minimum of ∆ lies
above the horizontal axis (as in Figure 2(a)), then ∆ is completely positive and so there is no
preference region for bulbs. In contrast, if the minimum lies below the horizontal axis (as in panels
12 The analysis here compares the cost of using bulbs with the cost of using kerosene. Yet consumers could use more
than one source of light. Households usually have a primary source of light as well as a less preferred secondary source
(e.g., candles, torches, firewood) on which they rely in the absence of their primary source. Hence “blackout” could
be interpreted as a period during which the consumer uses her secondary source. Our model can accommodate such
behavior by changing the value of β, in which case the preceding analysis would address the consumer’s choice of
bulbs versus kerosene as her primary source of light. However, this model does not address the scenario where these
sources could be jointly used. Instead, the model reflects our objective to analyze the cost structure when a consumer
abandons kerosene in adopting rechargeable bulbs. We discuss the consequences of jointly using kerosene and bulbs
in Section 4.1.5.
Uppari, Popescu, and Netessine: Selling Off-Grid Light to Liquidity Constrained Consumers 15
(b) and (c) of that figure), then depending on the value of limI→0 ∆, ∆ crosses that axis either
once or twice. (Note that limI→∞∆ =∞.) It is easy to see that
lim
I→0
∆≤ 0 ⇐⇒ β ≤ Ψ
B
{
pk
Ψˆk
− P
Ψ
}
≡ βˆ. (9)
Our next proposition formally establishes the necessary and sufficient conditions for ∆ to take the
various shapes plotted in Figure 2.
Shapes of Delta
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0
 
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Figure 2 Shapes of ∆. (a) pk <P/Q: ∆ is always positive. (b) pk ≥ P/Q and β≤ βˆ: ∆ crosses the
horizontal axis only once. (c) pk ≥ P/Q and β > βˆ: ∆ crosses the horizontal axis twice.
Proposition 2. [Consumer preference structure]
(i) If pk <P/Q, then the consumer prefers kerosene to bulbs.
(ii) If pk ≥ P/Q and β ≤ βˆ (where βˆ is as defined in (9)) then – for given µ, F, λ, P, Q, pk, b,
and β – there exists a threshold I1 such that the consumer prefers bulbs (resp., kerosene) if
the associated inconvenience level I ≤ I1 (resp., I > I1).
(iii) If pk ≥ P/Q and β > βˆ then – for given µ, F, λ, P, Q, pk, b, and β – there exist two thresholds,
I0 and I1, such that the consumer prefers bulbs if I0 ≤ I ≤ I1 and prefers kerosene otherwise.
For ease of exposition, hereafter we simply assume that I0 = 0 when β ≤ βˆ; then we can say that
the consumer prefers bulbs to kerosene if I0 ≤ I ≤ I1 irrespective of the value of her β. Proposition 2
can now be interpreted as follows. First consider the case when pk <P/Q; that is, suppose the unit
price of kerosene is lower than that of bulbs. Then, as shown in Figure 2(a), ∆ is always positive.
Because kerosene is a flexible resource and also cheaper, in this case the consumer is always better-
off using kerosene. The implication is that to be operable in the market, bulb recharges should be
priced below kerosene. So in countries like India and Sri Lanka, where kerosene is heavily subsidized
(IFC 2010), adoption of bulbs is expected to be low. Yet where kerosene is costlier than bulbs, as
in most African countries, the preference structure is more complex. Before explaining it in detail,
we state one more result that enables us to visualize preferences in the β–I plane.
Lemma 3. Both I0 and I1 are increasing in β.
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Figure 3 plots the zeros of ∆ (which exist only when pk ≥ P/Q) as a function of blackout sen-
sitivity. The graph reveals that there are two regions of preference for kerosene (∆> 0) and one
for bulbs (∆ ≤ 0). Region (I) consists of consumers with high levels of inconvenience relative to
their blackout sensitivity; we call them “inconvenience-averse” consumers. Because of their high
inconvenience levels, these consumers prefer to purchase less frequently and in large quantities to
reduce their inconvenience cost. Since kerosene offers them the flexibility of purchasing in large
quantities but bulbs do not, they prefer kerosene to bulbs. In contrast, region (III) consists of con-
sumers with high blackout sensitivity relative to their inconvenience levels. Such “blackout-averse”
consumers prefer to purchase more frequently but in small quantities to reduce their blackout cost.
As in region (I), these consumers prefer kerosene because it gives them the quantity flexibility that
bulbs do not. In region (II), consumers have moderate levels of inconvenience and are moderately
sensitive to blackouts. They prefer neither large quantities nor small quantities; the capacity offered
by bulbs leads to a lower cost than kerosene and hence they prefer bulbs to kerosene.
Prefere ce region




Uppari-Netessine-Popescu
Δ  0
(Kerosene)
Δ  0
(Bulbs)
Δ  0
(Kerosene)
Inconvenience-averse 
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Blackout-averse 
consumers
	
0
(I)
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Figure 3 Preference for bulbs versus kerosene when pk ≥ P/Q (when pk <P/Q, all consumers prefer
kerosene).
In summary, if kerosene is cheaper than bulbs (i.e., pk < P/Q) then the entire market prefers
kerosene; otherwise the market is split into three types of consumers, of which two types (the
inconvenience-averse and the blackout-averse) prefer kerosene and one prefers bulbs. We have
shown that the key drivers of this preference structure are (i) consumers’ liquidity constraints
(which lead to undesired blackouts), (ii) the need to balance blackout cost with inconvenience cost
associated with repeated purchases, and (iii) the flexibility of kerosene, which is preferred by both
inconvenience-averse and blackout-averse consumers. We emphasize that these preferences result
not from dissimilar inconvenience levels across the sources but rather from the need to balance the
inconvenience cost (with the same inconvenience levels across the sources) against the blackout
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cost. So it should be clear that, if the inconvenience level of consumers with bulbs is lower than
that with kerosene, then the lower overall cost of bulbs will make them preferable.
Thus the preference for kerosene, which on the surface may seem economically irrational, makes
more sense when we account for the operational underpinnings of consumer behavior. This inter-
play among liquidity, inconvenience, and flexibility in explaining seemingly irrational consumer
preferences has also been noted in other contexts. Karlan and Appel (2011) observe that “peo-
ple settle for second-best because first-best is inconvenient. They borrow from moneylenders at
high rates because microfinance banks have inflexible repayment schedules. They save their money
in non-interest-bearing clubs because the clubs offer deposit collection at subscribers’ businesses.
They send their children to more expensive private schools because private school tuition can be
paid in installments. And they treat their broken bones with herbal salve because they don’t have
to endure a week in the waiting room—and give up a week’s earnings in the process—to do it”
(p. 227).
Given the preference structure just described, the crucial question faced by a firm is how to
increase adoption of its bulbs. We answer this question in Section 5, but before we proceed with
the firm-level analysis we investigate the robustness of the above discussed preference structure to
the assumptions made in our model.
4.1. Robustness of Preference Structure
4.1.1. Saving Model. Our model assumes that consumers manage their income via mental
accounting and save only for their next purchase. However, if the consumer does save money for
future light purchases then she is less liquidity constrained than previously supposed. Our model
cannot capture such behavior because we would then lose the renewal structure central to our
analysis. Yet we can show that our results persist in the extreme case of a consumer who is a good
enough saver that she faces no liquidity constraints and therefore no blackouts. That scenario can
be expressed in our modeling framework as
∆ =
I +P
Q/λ
− Ik + pkQk
Qk/λ
= λ
(
I
Q
− Ik
Qk
)
−λ
(
pk− P
Q
)
.
If we assume (as in Figure 3) that the second term is positive, then ∆ could be positive if the
inconvenience level of kerosene Ik is significantly lower than I or if the kerosene purchase quantity
Qk is significantly larger than Q. Thus inconvenience and flexibility drive preferences for kerosene
even when the consumer is not liquidity constrained.
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4.1.2. Delay in Purchases. We have assumed that consumers do not delay purchasing
light once sufficient money has accrued (see Figure 1). That assumption seems reasonable enough,
but here we discuss how the preference structure is affected by relaxing it. For this purpose we
consider two plausible scenarios. First, the consumer could delay her purchase for a random duration
because of inertia, lethargy, or other pre-scheduled tasks. In this case, blackout duration increases
by a random amount in the expressions for C and Ck (an increase that affects both cycle length
and blackout costs). One can easily verify that, with this modification, ∆ continues to be U-shaped
in I and that its minimum is less than or greater than zero according as whether P/Q ≤ pk or
P/Q > pk. It follows that accounting for such random delays in purchases does not affect the
preference structure.
Now consider the scenario in which the consumer delays her purchase by some duration that
is strategically chosen to minimize her overall cost. This setting is analytically complex under a
stochastic income model, so our discussion here is based on a deterministic income model with
b(z) = z2 and pk/µ> 1/λ.
13 Consumers who use bulbs optimize the cycle length T , whereas those
who use kerosene optimize the combination of cycle length Tk and purchase quantity Qk. The
difference between the corresponding optimal costs is then given by
∆ = min
T≥P/µ
I +P +β([T −Q/λ]+)2
T
− min
Qk≥0,Tk≥0,
Tk≥pkQk/µ,Tk≤QkM
I + pkQk +β([Tk−Qk/λ]+)2
Tk
. (10)
The constraints T ≥ P/µ and Tk ≥ pkQk/µ ensure that cycle lengths are greater than the time it
takes to accrue sufficient money for the purchase. The constraint Tk ≤QkM (for M an arbitrarily
chosen large number) ensures that, if Qk = 0, then Tk is also equal to zero. Lemma A.5 (in the
Appendix A) shows that the ∆ in (10) is U-shaped in I. The minimum value of ∆ is less than
(resp., greater than) zero if P/Q≤ pk(1 + ζ) (resp., if P/Q > pk(1 + ζ)), where ζ ≥ 0. Because in
this model the consumer is behaving strategically with respect to bulb usage, the preference region
for bulbs is larger than in the previous model (as shown also by the higher threshold, pk(1 + ζ)
versus pk). Hence, our base model is actually the more conservative one in defining the preference
region for bulbs.
We believe that the first scenario is more realistic than the second: if consumers have sufficient
money, then they simply purchase light at the earliest they can without being too strategic about
this decision. In both scenarios, ∆ is U-shaped in I and crosses the horizontal axis at most twice –
creating two regions of preference for kerosene as before. Since both of these models yield results
that differ little from those predicted by our base model, they are not explored further.
13 The assumption pk/µ> 1/λ implies that the consumption time Qk/λ with kerosene is always less than the hitting
time pkQk/µ; that is, the kerosene user will always encounter blackouts. This assumption is reasonable given that
kerosene is a costly source of light.
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4.1.3. Bounds on Kerosene Purchase Quantity. The analysis in this section assumed
that consumers can purchase kerosene without any quantity restrictions. However, there could be
both lower and upper bounds on the purchase quantity due to seller-side measuring and holding
constraints. We can easily show that (a) if the lower bound is too small then the preference regions
are unaffected whereas (b) if this bound is too large then blackout-averse consumers switch to using
bulbs (because kerosene is no longer a flexible resource). A similar intuition applies with regard
to the upper bound. Therefore, constraints on kerosene quantity sold do not negatively affect the
preference region for bulbs.
4.1.4. Heterogeneity in Saving Rate. Our analysis so far has also assumed that the
population is homogeneous in their ability to save money for light. Here we discuss the preference
structure when consumers differ in their saving rates µ. It is easier to understand the resultant
preferences if we analyze them in terms of ν = 1/µ, because the impact of ν on consumer cost
is similar to that of β. While β affects the sensitivity of consumers toward blackouts, ν affects
the blackouts directly: Consumers with high (resp., low) values of β put a higher (resp., lower)
weight on the blackouts, whereas consumers with high (resp., low) values of ν face longer (resp.,
shorter) blackouts in expectation. Because of this relationship, the preference structure in ν–I plane
looks similar to the one in β–I plane shown in Figure 3. (Lemma A.6 formalizes this argument
for the deterministic income model with b(z) = z2.) We find that the consumers with relatively
high values of ν (who face tight liquidity constraints) tend to prefer the flexible kerosene because
they can purchase it in small quantities and thereby reduce their long-run blackout cost (similar
to blackout-averse consumers discussed earlier). Since consumers with relatively low values of ν
hardly face any blackouts, they also tend to prefer kerosene because they can reduce their long-run
inconvenience cost by purchasing it in large quantities (similar to inconvenience-averse consumers
discussed previously).
4.1.5. Joint Usage of Kerosene and Bulbs. Our model implicitly assumes that when a
consumer adopts rechargeable light bulb, she abandons using kerosene. In this section, we consider
two possible relaxations of this assumption: (i) consumer could use kerosene as a backup source to
avoid blackouts, and (ii) consumer could switch between the light sources because of fluctuations
in kerosene price over time.
Using kerosene to avoid blackouts. Here we assume that the consumer continues to keep her
kerosene lamp after she adopts bulbs. She could then purchase kerosene to avoid blackouts when
the bulb is unavailable (i.e., discharged) and she does not yet have enough money to recharge it.
We next discuss the consequences if consumer adopts such strategy. To sharpen the insights, we
first discuss the deterministic income case in detail, and briefly discuss the stochastic case later.
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We assume that kerosene purchases and bulb recharges are funded out of the same account. Then
purchasing kerosene requires money that, instead, could have been used for the bulb recharge,
resulting in delayed bulb recharge. Moreover, consumer could prefer experiencing blackouts to
spending money on kerosene which is usually a costly source of light. As a result, the effectiveness
of using it to avoid blackouts is not obvious.
First, consider the case when P/µ ≤ Q/λ. Consumer does not experience any blackouts with
bulb, and hence there is no need to use kerosene in conjunction with the bulb to avoid blackouts.
However, she can still prefer to use kerosene alone as a lighting source if her ∆ (computed based
on long-run costs of using bulb alone and using kerosene alone) is positive.
On the contrary, when P/µ>Q/λ, consumer experiences blackouts for a duration of P/µ−Q/λ
in each cycle, as shown in Figure 4(a). Consumer could avoid these blackouts by spending a part
of her light savings on kerosene. Let M0 = µQ/λ<P denote the money that she has in her account
when the bulb is discharged. If she spends a proportion 0 < α < 1 of this amount to purchase
kerosene, then she obtains αM0/pk hours of kerosene light. Since she consumes this light at λ
hours per day and adds µ dollars per day to her account, by the time her kerosene stock is
depleted she has accrued (αM0/pk)µ/λ dollars. Hence, at the end of first kerosene cycle she has
M1 = (1−α)M0 +(αM0/pk)µ/λ=M0(1−α+αγ) dollars in her account, where γ = µ/(λpk). If M1
is sufficient for the bulb recharge (i.e, M1 ≥ P ), then she recharges her bulb. Otherwise, she spends
proportion α of M1 on kerosene again to avoid blackouts. After n such kerosene cycles, money in
the account is given by Mn = M0(1− α+ αγ)n. Interestingly, consumer’s money in the account
after each successive kerosene cycle need not be increasing. Depending on the sign of α(1− γ),
we obtain two cases: Mn is decreasing in n as shown in Figure 4(b), and Mn is increasing in n
as shown in Figure 4(c). Specifically, Mn is decreasing (resp., increasing) in n if α(1− γ)≤ (>) 0,
which is equivalent to pk ≥ (<)µ/λ.
If the unit price of kerosene is high (defined here as pk ≥ µ/λ), then after each successive kerosene
cycle consumer is left with lower amount than what she had before that cycle. Therefore, purchasing
kerosene to avoid blackouts is not a sensible strategy in this case because, as shown in Figure 4(b),
this leads to a state where either consumer continuously uses kerosene (since she will never have
enough money for the bulb recharge), or she eventually faces blackouts if she decides to stop
using kerosene and accrue money for the bulb recharge (thus, not serving the purpose of avoiding
blackouts). Note that the condition for Mn to decrease in n is independent of α. Therefore, the
above argument continues to hold when consumer spends proportion αi on kerosene in cycle i,
where αi could be different across cycles.
Some consumers in the market use bulbs initially and they never recharge them again even when
the unit price of bulbs is lower than that of kerosene (i.e., pk >P/Q). Although such behavior could
Uppari, Popescu, and Netessine: Selling Off-Grid Light to Liquidity Constrained Consumers 21
/
 
/

/
Kerosene
Blackouts
Kerosene
  /  	 /
Bulbs BulbsBulbs
BulbsBulbsBulbs Bulbs
(a)
(b) (c)
Figure 4 Income cycles while using kerosene in conjunction with bulbs to avoid blackouts when P/µ>Q/λ.
(a) The base model where consumer experiences blackouts of duration P/µ−Q/λ. (b) Consumer uses kerosene
to avoid blackouts when pk ≥ µ/λ. (c) Consumer uses kerosene to avoid blackouts when pk <µ/λ.
be explained by consumer dissatisfaction either due to bad quality lighting or some malfunctioning
of bulbs, the case studied in Figure 4(b) offers another plausible explanation: If the prices are such
that pk >P/Q>µ/λ, then the consumers who use kerosene as a backup may never return to using
bulbs again because the recharge price becomes out of reach once they start using kerosene.
In contrast to Figure 4(b), if the unit price of kerosene is low (defined as pk < µ/λ), then after
each successive kerosene cycle consumer has more money than what she had before that cycle.
As a consequence, she will eventually have enough money for the bulb recharge, and the purchase
process renews after the recharge as shown in Figure 4(c). Although consumer here can completely
avoid blackouts by using kerosene, it could be the case that, since the price of kerosene is low, using
kerosene alone as the source results in a lower long-run cost. We next argue that this is in fact the
case. Since pk <µ/λ< P/Q, ∆ is always positive (by Proposition 2), and hence consumers in the
market prefer using kerosene alone to bulbs alone. Moreover, Lemma 4 shows that using kerosene
in conjunction with bulb (Figure 4(c)) leads to a higher cost than using kerosene alone. Hence,
although using kerosene to avoid blackouts is a sensible strategy in this case, it is inferior to using
kerosene alone.
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Lemma 4. If pk < µ/λ, then the long-run cost of using bulb with kerosene to avoid blackouts is
higher than the long-run cost of using kerosene alone.
To summarize, when the recharge price of the bulb is low enough, blackouts are inconsequential
to the consumer, and she does not use kerosene as a backup. However, when both the recharge
price of bulb and the unit price of kerosene are high enough, using kerosene to avoid blackouts
could lead to an undesirable state where either consumer continuously uses kerosene, or ends up
facing longer blackouts. In contrast, when kerosene’s unit price is low enough, consumer can fully
avoid blackouts, but it is actually cheaper to use kerosene alone in this case. Overall, we find that
using kerosene to avoid blackouts while using bulbs is inferior to using only a single source.
The above result is obtained by assuming that there is no uncertainty in consumer’s saving rate
and consumption rate. As long as income process is such that money in the account stochastically
decreases (resp., increases) after each successive kerosene cycle when the unit price of kerosene
is high (resp., low) enough, the arguments made above – and hence the corresponding insights –
continue to hold. Otherwise, it may be beneficial for the consumer to use kerosene as a backup to
mitigate her blackout risk. The formal analysis in this case, however, becomes intractable mainly
because either the renewal structure is lost, or the point of renewal cannot be determined. Further-
more, using kerosene as a backup could be beneficial when consumer has urgent (or unpredictable)
needs for light. When the bulb is unavailable, if an urgent need for light arises, and if consumer does
not have enough money to recharge the bulb, then she will most likely purchase kerosene using the
money in hand. These urgent needs could be modeled as an arrival process (e.g., Poisson process)
on top of the regular consumption process. Every time such a need arrives, consumer purchases
kerosene to satisfy that need, and the consumption process is reset thereafter. Provided that these
events are rare, and do not affect the regular consumption process, the above result with regard
to regular consumption continues to hold.
Fluctuations in kerosene price. Although our model setup assumes that a consumer evaluates
the lighting sources (i.e., computes ∆) at the outset (i.e., at t = 0) and uses the winning source
continually thereafter, it can also accommodate switching between sources which could be driven
by the variation in kerosene prices. Instead of computing ∆ only once at the beginning, we can
assume that the consumer computes ∆ at regular intervals. For example, she could reconsider the
sources at the end of every cycle, or when she learns about a change in kerosene price either from
her neighbor or when she passes by the kerosene store, etc. Because of renewals, past usage does not
affect the value of ∆ at time tr > 0 when consumer is reconsidering the sources. If we assume that
the best estimate of kerosene price in the future is the currently observed price (e.g., if consumer
lacks the ability to predict future kerosene prices, or mathematically, if kerosene prices follow a
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martingale), then the decision at tr simply depends on the sign of ∆(tr) computed based on the
kerosene price at time tr (call it pk(tr)). The following result establishes the relationship between
∆ and pk.
Lemma 5. ∆ is decreasing in kerosene price pk.
Also, note that limpk→0 ∆ = C > 0. Assuming that the population is heterogeneous in their
inconvenience levels, for a consumer with inconvenience level I, there exists a threshold pˆIk such
that ∆ is positive if pk < pˆ
I
k, and it is negative otherwise. (Here, pˆ
I
k is set to ∞ if limpk→∞∆ is
positive.) Therefore, consumer I uses kerosene after time tr if the price pk(tr) is lower than her
threshold price pˆIk, and uses bulbs otherwise.
5. Strategies for Increasing Bulb Adoption and Firm Revenue
As discussed in Section 4, consumers’ preference for kerosene is driven by the interplay among
liquidity, inconvenience, and flexibility. In this section we discuss several strategies that target each
of these three aspects toward the end of mitigating that preference.
5.1. Effects of Preference Structure on Bulb Design
The current design of bulbs is mainly a function of ergonomic factors (size, shape, usability, etc.)
and technological considerations (e.g., manufacturing costs, brightness constraints, bulb life). In
view of consumer preference structure, however, the firm would do well to consider the additional
factors discussed in this section.
To understand the impact of varying the bulb characteristics (namely its capacity Q and recharge
price P ) on firm’s revenue stream, we first translate the preference structure delineated in Section 4
into a market-level demand for bulbs. We augment this model by assuming that consumers are
heterogeneous in their levels of inconvenience, as characterized by the density function g and distri-
bution function G. We then define the demand for bulbs as the probability that a randomly chosen
consumer in the market prefers bulbs to kerosene. According to Proposition 2, this probability is
zero if P/Q> pk. In that case, it would make sense for the firm to abandon the market. Hence we
shall assume in this section that P/Q≤ pk, thereby imposing a natural lower bound on Q; formally,
Q ≥Q = P/pk. Then demand is equal to the probability mass lying between the two zeros of ∆
and is given by
D(P,Q) = Pr
(
I0(P,Q)≤ I ≤ I1(P,Q)
)
=G
(
I1(P,Q)
)−G(I0(P,Q)). (11)
The long-run revenue derived by the firm from a single consumer who uses bulbs, or the revenue
per consumer, is equal to the consumer’s long-run monetary cost P/Ψ(P,Q). We can now write
the long-run market-level revenue, or the aggregate revenue, as
R(P,Q) =
P
Ψ(P,Q)
D(P,Q).
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As we will see next, the analysis is more insightful if we make the following variable transforma-
tion: (x, q)≡ (P,Q/P ). Here, q is the capacity-price ratio (or bang for the buck) and x is the scale
of the bulb. By increasing (resp., decreasing) x we scale up (resp., down) both the bulb capacity
and the recharge price while keeping their ratio constant at q. We note that scale does not affect
revenue per consumer:
P
Ψ(P,Q)
=
P
Q/λ+E[P ε˜/µ−Q/λ]+ =
1
q/λ+E[ε˜/µ− q/λ]+ ≡
1
ψ(q)
.
This follows because consumers pay a low recharge price more frequently when x is small but pay
a high price less frequently when x is large. In our model, the amount paid in the long run under
both scenarios is the same. Hereafter, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote the zeros of ∆ as
I0(x, q) and I1(x, q), and the aggregate revenue as
R(x, q) =
1
ψ(q)
D(x, q). (12)
In the upcoming sections, we study the behavior of demand and aggregate revenue in terms
of x and q. We first investigate the trade-offs associated with varying scale at a given value of
capacity-price ratio in Section 5.1.1. It characterizes an optimal scale for the bulb, but more
importantly it suggests a way to improve demand by making the bulbs flexible. Section 5.1.2
explores the trade-offs involved in varying capacity-price ratio at a given value of scale. This
analysis yields an optimal bulb capacity at a given recharge price, which is useful in (commonly
encountered) settings where firm does not have much flexibility in setting the prices. We extend
this analysis in Section 5.1.3, where firm jointly optimizes on scale and capacity-price ratio (or
equivalently on bulb capacity and recharge price). Before we proceed with the analysis, we first
note a few technical details.
Owing to the analytical complexity of dealing with a generic b(z), in the rest of Section 5.1
we restrict the analysis to b(z) = z2 because doing so yields closed-form expressions for the zeros
of ∆ (see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix A). Numerical analysis suggests that the findings in this
section continue to hold for powers greater than 2. In addition, we assume that the distribution of I
satisfies the following properties: (a) g′(z)/g(z) is decreasing in z, (b) g(z)/(1−G(z)) is increasing
in z, (c) zg′(z)/g(z) is decreasing in z, and (d) zg(z)/G(z) is decreasing in z. These conditions are
not that restrictive because (a) is equivalent to the log-concavity of I’s PDF, and (b) is same as
increasing hazard rate. These properties are satisfied by a wide class of distributions (see Bagnoli
and Bergstrom 2005, Barlow and Proschan 1965). We show in Lemma A.2 that the distributions
commonly used to model positive random variables – such as gamma, log-normal, chi-squared, chi,
Weibull, exponential, power-law, and uniform distributions – satisfy conditions (c) and (d).
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5.1.1. Making Bulbs Flexible. Section 4 revealed that kerosene’s flexibility plays an
important role in driving consumer preference in its direction. Therefore, making rechargeable
bulbs flexible should effectively reduce kerosene usage. Recall that some consumers prefer kerosene
because bulb capacity – and the corresponding recharge price – are too high; these blackout-averse
consumers would prefer to pay a smaller amount for a lower quantity of light. The firm could
attract such consumers by allowing for partial recharges. This strategy could be implemented if
the firm provided indicators on the bulbs so that consumers and recharging centers could track
a bulb’s current charge level. Suppose the firm allowed bulbs to be recharged only halfway; then
some consumers inclined to purchase lower quantities of light would likely prefer these “half-bulb”
recharges even as those who prefer full bulb recharges maintain that preference. So by leveraging
consumer heterogeneity in the market, the firm can increase the demand for bulbs by making them
flexible. The following result helps us formalize this argument.
Proposition 3. For any given q, the following statements hold:
(i) both I0(x, q) and I1(x, q) increase with x; and
(ii) demand D(x, q) is unimodal in x.
On the one hand, if bulbs are scaled down (i.e., when x is reduced) then consumers use smaller
bulbs and pay less for recharging. Since blackout-averse consumers prefer smaller quantities, it
follows that the firm gains some of these consumers (i.e., I0 moves leftward) but also loses some
consumers who prefer bulbs with a greater capacity (i.e., also I1 moves leftward). Thus, the
blackout-averse market shrinks while the inconvenience-averse market expands. On the other hand,
if bulbs are scaled up then the inconvenience-averse market shrinks while the blackout-averse mar-
ket expands. Hence the firm cannot always increase its demand simply by changing the scale
factor. In fact, Proposition 3 shows that demand first increases and then decreases with scale.
Thus, a unique optimal scale exists which could be used by the firm to calibrate its bulb design.
(Since scale affects demand but not revenue per consumer, demand-maximizing scale is same as the
revenue-maximizing scale.) However, in addition to yielding the optimal scale, the above proposi-
tion suggests a way to improve demand by making the bulbs flexible.
Suppose that the firm allows bulbs to be recharged halfway. This scenario is equivalent to offering
consumers a choice between two bulbs: one with scale x or one with scale 0.5x. Depending on the
consumer’s trade-off between the inconvenience cost and the blackout cost, she will prefer one of
these bulbs and will end up incurring the minimum of C0.5 ≡C(0.5x, q) and C1 ≡C(x, q). Then
∆ = min{C0.5,C1}−C∗k = min{C0.5−C∗k ,C1−C∗k} ≡min{∆0.5,∆1}. (13)
Figure 5(a) plots the shapes of ∆0.5, ∆1 and ∆. For notational convenience, we denote Iθj = Ij(θx, q)
for j ∈ {0,1}. As argued previously, consumers who prefer a full bulb recharge to kerosene (i.e.,
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those between I10 and I
1
1 ) will continue to prefer bulbs. But now the firm gains, in addition, a part
of the blackout-averse market (between I0.50 and I
1
0 ); the result is an expansion of the preference
region for bulbs (spanning from I0.50 to I
1
1 ). It is interesting that, unlike the case of when only
scaled-down bulbs are available, the inconvenience-averse market remains unaffected.
Flexible bulbs 2
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 5 Preference structure with flexible bulbs. (a) θ ∈ {0.5,1}: firm gains from blackout-averse market.
(b) θ ∈ {1,2}: firm gains from inconvenience-averse market. (c) θ ∈ {0.5,1,2}: firm gains from both markets.
Recall that scale does not affect the firm’s revenue per consumer. Those who prefer θ= 0.5 (resp.,
θ= 1) pay smaller (resp., larger) amounts but recharge more often (resp., less often), and the firm
benefits equally in the long run from both of these revenue streams. Thus partial recharging is a
strategy that increases demand but does not affect revenue per consumer; the outcome is higher
aggregate revenue. We can easily show that this result holds for any θ < 1.
We have seen that providing the option to choose between θ= 0.5 and θ= 1 shrinks the blackout-
averse market without affecting the inconvenience-averse market. Figure 5(b) shows that, con-
versely, allowing consumers to choose between θ = 1 and θ = 2 shrinks the inconvenience-averse
market without affecting the blackout-averse market. Matters improve still further (from the firm’s
standpoint) if consumers can choose among all three of these scaling factors: as can be seen in
panel (c) of the figure, both the inconvenience-averse and blackout-averse markets shrink. So by
scaling up and offering multiple partial recharge levels, the firm can offer a light source that mimics
the flexibility of kerosene and so results in higher demand.14
It is important to note that there are practical limits to the extent of scaling bulbs and to
the number of partial recharge levels. When a bulb is scaled up, its capacity and (full) recharge
price increase. However, increasing them indefinitely may not be desirable because of the reasons
discussed in the following sections. The subsequent analysis reveals that the optimal capacity and
recharge price can be found, and partial recharging could then be implemented with actual bulb
capacity and full recharge price set to these optimal values. Offering several partial recharge levels
could negatively impact the bulb’s battery life while also requiring recharge centers to upgrade
their technology to precisely track the charge level in the bulb. Yet if implemented in moderation,
this strategy could lead to considerable improvements in adoption rates and aggregate revenue.
14 We demonstrate this effect using θ= 0.5 and θ= 2, but clearly it will persist for other scale values.
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5.1.2. Setting the Bulb Capacity Optimally. First note that varying capacity-price
ratio q at a fixed scale x is equivalent to varying the bulb capacity Q (= xq) without affecting
the recharge price P (= x). This is an important case to consider because firms serving the BoP
consumers generally do not have much flexibility with regard to prices. Because of the context (i.e.,
impoverished regions) in which they operate, there is nearly always an upper bound on what can
be charged. At the same time, there is a lower bound stemming from the annual cash flow required
to repay venture capitalists or service bank debt. Our discussions with Nuru’s CEO revealed that
consumers tend to view bulb recharges as analogous to mobile phone recharges and so “anchor” on
the latter’s fees.15 Furthermore, to the extent that bulb recharges are costlier than mobile phone
recharges, consumers have an incentive to “hack” bulbs so they can be recharged at a mobile
phone recharge center. In such case, the firm’s full bulb recharge price cannot differ much from
the recharge price of a mobile phone. The effect of all these constraints is that the firm is forced
to operate within a very narrow price range. However, there are no such tight constraints on the
bulb capacity that firm could offer, and hence it is a key decision variable. The following result
characterizes the trade-offs involved in varying q.
Lemma 6. For any given x, when capacity-price ratio q increases:
(i) the consumer’s long-run inconvenience cost, monetary cost, and blackout cost decrease;
(ii) I0(x, q) decreases and I1(x, q) increases; and
(iii) demand D(x, q) increases.
At a given scale, increasing q is equivalent to increasing bulb capacity. With increased capacity,
consumer visits the recharge center less frequently and so reduces her long-run inconvenience cost.
Because the recharge price is unchanged, she also pays less in the long run; this reduces her
monetary cost. Moreover, the resulting longer consumption time allows her to accrue more money
before the bulb is discharged, which reduces her blackout cost in the long run. Thus, increasing
bulb capacity reduces the overall long-run cost of consumers.
Because increased bulb capacity reduces both long-run blackout and inconvenience costs, it
attracts some consumers from both the blackout-averse market and the inconvenience-averse mar-
ket (as shown by the decrease in I0 and the increase in I1, respectively); hence the demand for
bulbs increases. However, it also reduces revenue per consumer. These opposing effects of increas-
ing capacity on aggregate revenue R(x, q) lead us to characterize the optimal bulb capacity as
described in our next proposition.16 Here, we denote q= 1/pk. (Demand and aggregate revenue are
zero for any q < 1/pk.)
15 Conversation with Sameer Hajee (CEO of Nuru) in February 2014. People at the BoP can recharge their mobile
phones only by visiting a dedicated recharge center.
16 The expression for R(x, q) in (12) does not account for long-run cost incurred by the firm to manufacture the bulbs.
This cost can be easily incorporated in our model, and it does not affect our insights.
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Proposition 4. For a given x, the aggregate revenue R(x, q) is unimodal in the interval
[
q, q
]
,
where the upper bound q uniquely solves the equation ∂I1/∂Q
I1
= 2∂ψ/∂Q
ψ
.
We can prove the unimodality of aggregate revenue only in the interval
[
q, q
]
because R(x, q) is
neither concave nor quasi-concave in q; it is quasi-concave only in a part of its domain. Its behavior
beyond q is unclear and characterizing it is analytically cumbersome. Although the upper bound
on capacity may seem restrictive, extensive numerical analysis indicates that q is large enough to
be not restrictive in practice. In essence, regardless of the shape that R(x, q) takes, there remains a
trade-off between demand and revenue per consumer because we assumed that the recharge price
is fixed. Hence firm should be mindful of this trade-off while designing bulbs for the markets where
it does not have much flexibility in setting prices. We relax this assumption in the next section
where the firm can set recharge price for the bulb in addition to its capacity.
5.1.3. Joint Optimization of Recharge Price and Bulb Capacity. Recall that opti-
mally determining recharge price P and bulb capacity Q is equivalent to optimally determining
scale x and capacity-price ratio q. Section 5.1.1 showed that, at a given capacity-price ratio, by
increasing (resp., decreasing) scale firm gains some inconvenience-averse (resp., blackout-averse)
consumers but loses some blackout-averse (resp., inconvenience-averse) consumers; this trade-off
yields an optimal scale (Proposition 3). Moreover, Section 5.1.2 showed that, at a given scale,
although increasing capacity-price ratio always benefits consumers and increases demand, doing so
reduces the firm’s revenue derived from consumers in the long run; this trade-off yields an opti-
mal capacity-price ratio (Proposition 4). These results suggest that by jointly utilizing these two
trade-offs, we can also obtain the optimal scale and capacity-price ratio pair.
From Proposition 3(ii), we know that the demand-maximizing (equivalently revenue-maximizing)
scale for a given q can be uniquely obtained. Denote x∗(q) = arg maxx≥0D(x, q), D
∗(q) =
D(x∗(q), q), and R∗(q) =R(x∗(q), q). Then, from (12) we obtain
R∗(q) =
1
ψ(q)
D∗(q),
which now accounts for the optimal scale x∗(q). If q∗∗ maximizes R∗(q), then the optimal price and
capacity for the bulb are given by
(
P ∗, Q∗
)
=
(
x∗(q∗∗), x∗(q∗∗)q∗∗
)
. Therefore, determining these
optimal parameters hinges on determining the optimal q∗∗. It is easy to prove the existence of such
q∗∗ in [q,∞) because
∂R∗
∂q
=
D∗
ψ2
∂ψ
∂q
(
ψ
D∗
∂D∗/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
− 1
)
≡ D
∗
ψ2
∂ψ
∂q
(
h(q)− 1), (14)
and one can easily verify that limq→q h(q) =∞ and limq→∞ h(q) = 0; therefore the above derivative
crosses the horizontal axis at least once from above.
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However, proving the uniqueness of q∗∗ is intractable. This is because, similar to R(x, q) in (12),
R∗(q) is neither concave nor quasi-concave in its domain. It is also quasi-concave only in a part of
its domain, but this part itself depends on x∗(q) for which we do not have a closed form expression,
thereby complicating the analysis. Nevertheless, numerical analysis reveals that h(q) in (14) is
decreasing in q for a wide range of parameters, and hence q∗∗ can be uniquely obtained.
5.2. Alleviating Liquidity Constraints
We know from Section 4 that not only flexibility concerns but also liquidity constraints and incon-
venience levels play an important role in determining consumer preferences. Here we investigate
the strategies for (and effects of) alleviating liquidity constraints. In Section 3 we described how a
consumer’s liquidity constraints determine the time it takes for her to accrue enough money to pur-
chase light (i.e., the hitting time), which in turn determines the blackout duration. Recall that the
hitting time τ˜ = (P/µ)ε˜ has two components: P/µ, which captures the affordability of recharges;
and ε˜, which characterizes the uncertainty in a consumer’s life. We next discuss strategies aimed
at each of these components and their effect on the adoption of bulbs. Note that these strategies
affect these components directly without affecting the bulb capacity.
5.2.1. Affecting Affordability. Recharges become more affordable when either the
recharge price P falls or the saving rate µ rises. Strategies such as price discounts, subsidies, etc.
reduce the price paid by consumers for recharges. The saving rate could be artificially increased
by strategies such as cash drops and allowing consumers to recharge on credit. As argued next,
the saving rate could also be naturally increased by providing consumers with a “safe box” to
save money for light. It is well established that poor people have difficulty saving as much as they
would like. Their scarcity mindset (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013) makes efficient money manage-
ment difficult, which in turn leads to more scarcity in their lives – the so-called scarcity trap. Yet
there is evidence from a field experiment in Kenya (Dupas and Robinson 2013) that a simple box
with a lock and key results in consumers substantially increasing their investment in preventa-
tive health and hence reducing their vulnerability to health shocks. These authors argue that this
safe box “can act as a commitment device: once money was put into the box, it was labeled as
health savings, which made it less fungible and therefore less susceptible to friends’ requests and
daily spending” (p. 1163). We can extend these arguments to the context of light and argue that
providing consumers with a safe box for light might increase their saving rate.
By Lemma 1(i), either a decrease in P or an increase in µ will reduce blackouts experienced by
the consumer. However, reducing blackouts per se need not reduce the consumer’s overall cost, a
claim we formalize as follows.
Proposition 5. [Shapes of long-run cost components]
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(i) The long-run inconvenience cost I/Ψ is decreasing in P and increasing in µ.
(ii) The long-run monetary cost P/Ψ is increasing in P and decreasing in µ.
(iii) The long-run blackout cost βB/Ψ is increasing in P and decreasing in µ.
This proposition shows that all the components of consumer cost are not monotonic – in the
same direction – with respect to P and µ. So even though one might expect the long-run cost C
simply to increase with P and decrease with µ, this need not always be the case. As price increases,
the recharge frequency decreases and the consumer uses less light in the long run. If our over-
all cost consisted of only the consumption, then the cost would (as expected) increase with P .
However, inconvenience is another factor in our cost model. Because of lower recharge frequency,
the consumer’s long-run inconvenience in recharging the bulb also declines. Thus, a price increase
hurts the consumer in terms of reduced consumption but also benefits her in terms of reduced
inconvenience. Similarly, the consumer’s recharge frequency (and hence light consumption in the
long run) increases with her saving rate; when only consumption is considered, her cost decreases
with µ. Yet because of higher recharge frequency, she must pay more money and also incurs higher
inconvenience. In short: because our model incorporates several cost dimensions, changes in P and
µ could result in the consumer benefiting in terms of some dimensions but not others. Hence it is
hardly surprising that we observe non-monotonicities in C.17
Remark 1. Generally speaking, long-run consumer cost C is non-monotonic in P and µ. For
example, if the PDF of ε˜ is log-concave and if b(z) = zm for m> 1 an integer, then the following
statements hold.
(i) C is U-shaped in the saving rate µ.
(ii) C is N-shaped in the recharge price P if I > Iˆ and is otherwise increasing; here the threshold Iˆ
is a function of µ, F, λ, Q, b, and β.
Proof is given in the Appendix A.
In other words, increasing affordability by reducing P and/or boosting µmay not always lower the
consumer’s overall cost. The main reason for these ambiguous effects is that increased affordability
benefits consumers in terms of consumption but affects them negatively in terms of inconvenience
(since increased consumption in the long run also increases inconvenience). As it could also lead to
significantly higher costs, it could induce some consumers to prefer using kerosene. These dynamics
17 The non-monotonicity of cost arises because consumers in our base model do not strategically delay their purchases.
We can use the model from Section 4.1.2 to verify that the consumer cost with strategic delays is monotonically
increasing in P and decreasing in µ. As pointed out previously, our base model takes a more conservative approach in
defining preferences for bulbs than does the model with strategic delays. It follows that the prescription derived from
the former is also more conservative than that derived from the latter. Therefore, if consumers purchase strategically
then the firm can increase adoption simply by alleviating liquidity constraints.
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explain why the strategies discussed above need not lead to greater adoption of rechargeable bulbs.
Given that more inconvenience in the long run is the culprit here, those strategies are more likely
to increase the adoption rate if they are implemented in conjunction with inconvenience-reducing
strategies; these are discussed in Section 5.3.
5.2.2. Affecting Income Uncertainty. Here we argue that micropayments using mobile
technology, when implemented effectively, could reduce consumers’ income uncertainty. With the
increased market penetration of this technology in Sub-Saharan Africa and in developing Asia –
penetration levels in 2014 were, respectively, 39% and 45% (GSMA 2015) – mobile phone–based
money transfer services have become fairly prominent in these regions. In Kenya, for instance, the
solar-based lighting solutions marketed by M-Kopa18 depend on monitoring consumer payments
via the M-Pesa mobile payment service. In our context, this approach would translate into the firm
asking a consumer not to pay P all at once but instead to pay a smaller amount p over n periods
(such that P = np). We remark that this approach will not reduce inconvenience for the consumer,
who must still travel to the recharging center to get the bulb recharged. Yet as we show next, it
does reduce her income uncertainty and therefore reduces the expected blackout duration.
The logistics of such an arrangement could be as follows. The consumer purchases a bulb that
is fully charged. While using this bulb, she makes micropayments for the next recharge through
her mobile phone. Once the n required payments have been made, the consumer’s bulb can be
recharged at the center at no additional cost. This process then repeats after the bulb is recharged.

Mobile micropaymen  v3

̃ ̃
(a) (b)
Figure 6 Mobile micropayments and hitting time in a cycle. (a) τ˜ is the hitting time under our base model’s
payment scheme. (b) τ˜n is the hitting time under a mobile micropayment scheme with n= 3 and P = 3p.
Figure 6 plots the hitting times without micropayments (panel (a)) and with micropayments
where n= 3 (panel (b)). As we can see in Figure 6(b), a consumer’s income needs to hit a lower
threshold p yet must do so n times per cycle. In this case the hitting time is given by τ˜n =
pε˜1/µ+ · · ·+ pε˜n/µ= P e˜n/µ, where e˜n =
∑
i ε˜i/n. The corresponding expected blackout duration
18 http://www.m-kopa.com/
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and blackout cost are given by Ln = E[P e˜n/µ−Q/λ]+ and Bn = Eb[P e˜n/µ−Q/λ]+, respectively.
Then our next lemma follows once we note that e˜n is a mean-preserving spread of e˜n+1.
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Lemma 7. With mobile micropayments, both the expected blackout duration Ln and the expected
blackout cost Bn are decreasing in n.
The effect on blackouts of increasing n is identical to that of increasing µ. Numerical analyses
suggest that, much as in Remark 1, the consumer’s overall cost is non-monotonic in n; hence
mobile micropayments may not always result in higher adoption rates. Once again, however, if this
approach is combined with inconvenience-reducing strategies then the adoption of bulbs is likely
to increase.
5.3. Reducing Inconvenience
Although we did not account for any difference in inconvenience levels between bulbs and kerosene
when modeling the consumer preferences, it is clear that reducing the inconvenience associated
with using bulbs would decrease consumer cost and increase the adoption of bulbs. In this section
we suggest several strategies for reducing consumer inconvenience and also discuss their limitations.
The firm could significantly reduce inconvenience by implementing a door-to-door bulb recharge
service. For example, employees at the recharging center could collect discharged bulbs from con-
sumers at their respective residences and then deliver the recharged bulbs later that day. Yet not
only would implementing such a service be costly, it is not clear how employees could be incentivized
to do so. An alternative approach would be for the firm to increase the number of recharging cen-
ters. If these centers are optimally located, then the average consumer would not have to travel so
far for a recharge; this inconvenience-reducing strategy could have the further benefit of increasing
competition among centers, which might motivate employees to improve the quality of their ser-
vice. Of course, such an approach would increase the firm’s fixed costs associated with establishing
multiple recharge centers (hiring and training employees, setting up the equipment, etc.).
Recharging bulbs now takes about 1–2 hours with a solar-based system or 20–30 minutes with
a mechanical system. Firms could reduce consumer waiting time to zero by adopting the business
model of “battery switching” stations for electric cars (Avci et al. 2015). Under this model, the
consumer would not purchase a bulb but instead would subscribe to a service that provides access
to one whenever needed. It would then be the recharge center’s responsibility to maintain an
inventory of recharged bulbs and to exchange (for a modest fee) consumers’ discharged bulbs with
recharged ones. The firm could also set up multiple such centers in each village, which would
19 It is easy to see that the variance of e˜n is greater than that of e˜n+1. Moreover, we can write e˜n = e˜n+1 + z˜ for
z˜ = [(ε˜1− ε˜2) + 2(ε˜2− ε˜3) + · · ·+n(ε˜n− ε˜n+1)]/((n+ 1)n), where E[z˜] = 0. Then, by the definition in Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1970), e˜n is a mean-preserving spread of e˜n+1.
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reduce consumer travel distances in addition to their waiting times. However, the firm should be
cautious when implementing this business model. If the firm has already sold bulbs to consumers,
then the “endowment” effect (Thaler 1980) could render the service ineffective; consumers might
be unwilling to exchange their own bulbs with some random other bulbs. Hence this subscription
approach would likely be far more successful if implemented in villages that constitute a new
market.
Firm could also encourage (or incentivize) consumers to “pool” their bulb recharges. Thus, for
example, a single household among five to ten like households could take the responsibility of
collecting and transporting all their bulbs to be recharged; members of the group would share
this burden by taking turns. So instead of reducing each household’s inconvenience, this strategy
would reduce the group’s collective inconvenience. One can expect, though, that the strategy would
involve coordination problems among households with different usage patterns.
The technology used to recharge bulbs can often be used also to recharge mobile phones. It follows
that the firm could incentivize consumers to combine their bulb recharging with mobile phone
recharging, thereby reducing inconvenience in the long run. Once again, however, coordinating
difficulties will likely arise to the extent that mobile recharging frequencies differ from those for
bulb recharging. We believe that the efficacy of these various strategies is best understood by
experimenting with them in the field. One could also build formal models to investigate which
strategy should perform better and under what circumstances. That task is beyond the scope of
this paper, so we leave it for future research.
6. Conclusions
Understanding why poor people prefer one technology over another is crucial in designing effective
policies and implementing suitable business models. Many technologies, although perceived at the
outset to be beneficial to the poor, are not easily adopted; examples include insecticide-treated
bed nets (Cohen and Dupas 2010), water purification solutions (Ashraf et al. 2010), fertilizers
(Duflo et al. 2011), roundabout water pumps (Sodhi and Tang 2011), and improved stoves (Hanna
et al. 2012). Several books have been written to demystify seemingly irrational preferences of the
poor, leading to subsequently designed programs that made a profound difference in their lives
(Banerjee and Duflo 2011, Karlan and Appel 2011, Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). We believe
that our research contributes to this impactful stream of literature by explaining preferences for
light sources at the bottom of the pyramid and designing strategies to increase adoption of clean
alternatives.
We build a novel consumer behavior model that accounts for the liquidity constraints faced by
poor consumers and for the inconvenience they incur from blackouts and repeated purchases. This
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model allows us to characterize consumer preferences for each technology by assuming that they
choose the light source which leads to lower long-run cost. Our analysis reveals that rechargeable
bulbs are a viable market alternative only if they are offered at a lower marginal price than kerosene.
So in countries such as India and Sri Lanka, where kerosene is heavily subsidized (IFC 2010), the
adoption of rechargeable bulb technology is expected to be low. In fact, Nuru Energy’s recharge
revenue from India is but a fifth of its revenue from African markets (Carrick and Santos 2013). Yet
in African countries, where using kerosene is significantly more expensive than bulbs, we find that
preferences for the two technologies are mixed. Our model indicates that consumers will continue
to prefer kerosene if they are strongly averse either to blackouts or to recharge inconvenience.
The reason is that kerosene offers consumers flexibility with regard to quantity, which helps them
reduce long-run blackout and inconvenience costs. The derived preference structure is robust to
bounds on kerosene purchase quantity, delays in purchases (both random and strategic), consumer
heterogeneity in saving rates, fluctuations in kerosene prices, and several other relaxations of the
assumptions discussed in the paper.
Of course, there are some other plausible explanations for the observed consumer preference for
kerosene: lack of information about bulbs or low appreciation for their benefits, a mistrust of new
technologies, and habit formation. Yet our model suggests that consumers might prefer kerosense
even when behavioral factors (e.g., ignorance, trust, habits) do not play a role.
We propose several ways in which a firm offering clean rechargeable technologies could gain
consumers from market segments that prefer kerosene. At any given recharge price, an increase in
bulb capacity allows the firm to capture consumers from both inconvenience-averse and blackout-
averse segments of the market. However, with larger bulbs the recharge frequency declines and so
the firm’s revenue per consumer decreases. So even though increasing bulb capacity always benefits
consumers, beyond a certain threshold such increases are detrimental to the firm’s long-run revenue;
therefore, firm should be mindful of this trade-off while designing bulbs for the markets where it does
not have much flexibility in setting prices. The firm can preclude declines in revenue per consumer
by varying the scale, rather than the capacity, of its rechargeable bulbs. Then the firm gains
consumers from one market segment, but it also loses consumers from the other. Yet by enabling
partial recharges (which is equivalent in theory to providing multiple scale options), the firm
could gain more blackout-averse consumers without losing any inconvenience-averse consumers.
Moreover, the revenue-maximizing bulb capacity and recharge price pair can be found, and partial
recharging could then be implemented with actual bulb capacity and full recharge price set to these
optimal values.
Strategies that reduce consumer inconvenience also reduce the overall long-run cost of bulbs
relative to kerosene, leading to increased adoption. The same cannot be said, however, of strategies
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that aim to alleviate liquidity constraints: providing consumers with a “safe box” to save money for
light (increases the saving rate), introducing mobile micropayments (helps reduce income uncer-
tainty), offering price discounts or subsidies, and so forth. Strategies of this type reduce blackouts,
but they result in higher consumption that in turn leads to increased long-run inconvenience costs.
It follows that the effect of such strategies on overall consumer cost, and hence on adoption, is
ambiguous. However, adoption levels are likely to increase when these strategies are implemented in
conjunction with strategies aimed at reducing consumer inconvenience. Thus our results highlight
the crucial role that inconvenience plays in determining consumer preferences and hence the need
to mitigate that inconvenience if increased bulb adoption is to occur.
Our research could be extended in several directions. On the modeling side, we do not account
for the impact of light sources on the health and wealth of the consumers. For example, having
more light could enable the consumer to participate in more income generating activities, thereby
increasing her saving rate in the future. Using a harmful source such as kerosene could reduce the
lifetime of the consumer, increase her healthcare costs, and result in less saving for light. The future
research could address these issues. On the empirical side, the efficacy of our proposed strategies
for increasing the adoption of bulbs, in addition to raising awareness about the health hazards of
kerosene, could be tested in the field using randomized controlled trials. Such efforts are currently
undertaken by, for example, International Growth Center20 and ENERGIA21 with Nuru Energy
and Innovations for Poverty Actions22 in Rwanda. These experiments could serve also as a source of
fine-grained data on the characteristics (light usage, expenditures, etc.) of poor households, which
would help us better understand their consumption and saving patterns, thereby enabling us to
design better business models and energy policies.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Let ρ=Qµ/(λP ).
(i) The results for L follow by noting that the corresponding partial derivatives have the desired sign:
∂L
∂P
=
1
µ
∫ ∞
ρ
εdF (ε)≥ 0, ∂L
∂Q
=− 1
λ
(1−F (ρ))≤ 0, ∂L
∂µ
=− P
µ2
∫ ∞
ρ
εdF (ε)≤ 0. (15)
Similarly, the results for B follow because b is increasing:
∂B
∂P
=
1
µ
∫ ∞
ρ
b′
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
εdF (ε)≥ 0,
∂B
∂Q
=− 1
λ
∫ ∞
ρ
b′
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
dF (ε)≤ 0, (16)
∂B
∂µ
=− P
µ2
∫ ∞
ρ
b′
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
εdF (ε)≤ 0.
(ii) Recall that Ψ =Q/λ+L. Hence Ψ is increasing in Q because
∂Ψ
∂Q
=
F (ρ)
λ
≥ 0. (17)
The results with respect to (w.r.t.) P and µ follow immediately from part (i). 
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Proof of Proposition 1. Let ρk = µ/(λpk).
(i) Let Ψk =Qk/λ+ E[pkQkε˜/µ−Qk/λ]+ =Qk(1/λ+ E[pkε˜/µ− 1/λ]+) =QkΨˆk, where Ψˆk is independent
of Qk. Then
Ck =
I + pkQk +βBk
Ψk
=
pk
Ψˆk
+
I +βBk
QkΨˆk
.
The long-run monetary cost is independent of Qk. Note that
Bk
Qk
=
1
Qk
∫ ∞
ρk
b
(
pkQkε
µ
− Qk
λ
)
dF (ε) and
∂(Bk/Qk)
∂Qk
=
Hk
Q2k
;
here
Hk =
∫ ∞
ρk
[(
pkQkε
µ
− Qk
λ
)
b′
(
pkQkε
µ
− Qk
λ
)
− b
(
pkQkε
µ
− Qk
λ
)]
dF (ε).
The integrand (in brackets) is of the form zb′(z)− b(z), where z ≥ 0; it is positive and increasing because it
equals zero when z = 0 and its derivative is zb′′(z)≥ 0 (as follows from the convexity of b). Therefore, Hk is
also positive and increasing in Qk. The derivative of Ck w.r.t. Qk is then given by
∂Ck
∂Qk
=
1
Q2kΨˆk
[−I +βHk].
Since limQk→0Hk = 0 and since limQk→∞Hk =∞ (by our assumption that limz→∞ zb′(z)− b(z) =∞), it
follows that the term in brackets crosses the x-axis exactly once from below, which yields the unique mini-
mum Q∗k.
(ii) Observe that
∂2Ck
∂I∂Qk
=− 1
Q2kΨˆk
≤ 0 and ∂
2Ck
∂β∂Qk
=
Hk
Q2kΨˆk
≥ 0.
The desired result now follows from Topkis (1998). 
Proof of Lemma 2. The derivative of ∆ w.r.t. I is
∂∆
∂I
=
∂C
∂I
− ∂C
∗
k
∂I
=
1
Ψ
− 1
Q∗kΨˆk
. (18)
According to Proposition 1(ii), Q∗k is increasing in I. Hence the derivative in (18) is also increasing in I and
so ∆ is convex in I. It is easy to see that limI→0Q∗k = 0 and limI→∞Q
∗
k =∞, from which it follows that
limI→0 ∂∆/∂I =−∞ and limI→∞ ∂∆/∂I = 1/Ψ> 0. So here the derivative of ∆ crosses the x-axis exactly
once from below, which leads to a unique minimum. 
Proof of Proposition 2. First note that the preference region for bulbs exists if and only if (iff) the
minimum value of ∆ is less than zero. We shall demonstrate that this minimum is negative iff P/Q≤ pk.
Let ∆m denote the minimum value of ∆, and let this minimum be achieved at Im. Then
∆m =
(
I
Ψ
− I
Q∗kΨˆk
)∣∣∣∣
Im
+
(
P
Ψ
− pk
Ψˆk
)∣∣∣∣
Im
+
(
βB
Ψ
− βB
∗
k
Q∗kΨˆk
)∣∣∣∣
Im
. (19)
By (18), the first term in parentheses is equal to zero at Im. The second term in (19) is independent of Im.
To show that it is negative iff P/Q≤ pk, we rewrite P/Ψ as pl/Ψˆl; here pl = P/Q is the unit price of bulbs
and Ψˆl = Ψ/Q. Now note that the function p/(1/λ+E[pε˜/µ−1/λ]+) is increasing in p because its derivative,
F (µ/(λp))/λ
(1/λ+E[pε˜/µ− 1/λ]+)2 ,
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is positive. Therefore, if pl ≤ (>)pk then pl/Ψˆl ≤ (>)pk/Ψˆk.
We now show that the third term of (19) is also negative iff P/Q≤ pk. By (18), the sign of this term depends
only on the sign of B−B∗k evaluated at Im, which is given by
Eb
[
P ε˜
µ
− Q
λ
]+
−Eb
[
pkQ
∗
kε˜
µ
− Q
∗
k
λ
]+∣∣∣∣
Im
=Eb
[
P ε˜
µ
− Q
λ
]+
−Eb
[
Ψ
Ψˆk
(
pkε˜
µ
− 1
λ
)]+
.
Now we can see that (
P ε˜
µ
− Q
λ
)
− Ψ
Ψˆk
(
pkε˜
µ
− 1
λ
)
=
Ψε˜
µ
(
pl
Ψˆl
− pk
Ψˆk
)
+
Q
λΨˆk
(Ψˆl− Ψˆk)
is negative iff pl ≤ pk. The desired result follows by noting that the positive part, the monotonically increas-
ing b, and the expectation preserve this relationship.
Therefore, if (i) pk <P/Q, then ∆m is positive and hence ∆ is positive (as in Figure 2(a)), (ii) pk ≥ P/Q and
β ≤ βˆ, then ∆m is negative but limI→0 ∆≤ 0; ∆ starts negative and crosses the horizontal axis only once at
I1 (as in Figure 2(b)), and (iii) pk ≥ P/Q and β > βˆ, then ∆m is negative and limI→0 ∆> 0; ∆ starts positive
and crosses the horizontal axis twice at I0 and I1 (as in Figure 2(c)). 
Proof of Lemma 3. Because the Ij (j ∈ {0,1}) are zeros of ∆, we can use the implicit function theorem
to write their derivatives w.r.t. β as
∂Ij
∂β
=−∂∆/∂β
∂∆/∂I
∣∣∣∣
Ij
.
By definition, ∂∆/∂I is negative (resp. positive) at I0 (resp. I1). Using the technique employed for proving
Lemma 2 and Proposition 2, we can show that, for any given I, there are two zeros of ∆ w.r.t. β; we label
them β0 and β1 (with β0 <β1). At any zero of ∆, by definition we have
I
(
1
Ψ
− 1
Ψ∗k
)
+β
(
B
Ψ
− B
∗
k
Ψ∗k
)
=
pk
Ψˆk
− P
Ψ
=⇒ I ∂∆
∂I
+β
∂∆
∂β
> 0. (20)
Consider a point on the curve I0(β). By definition, ∂∆/∂I < 0. We can use (20) to show that ∂∆/∂β > 0 at
this zero; hence I0(β) is increasing in β. Now consider a point on the curve β0(I). By definition, ∂∆/∂β < 0,
and again by (20) we have ∂∆/∂I > 0 at this zero. Hence the β0(I) curve is increasing and so its inverse,
the I1(β) curve, must also be increasing. 
Proof of Lemma 4. First, we characterize the long-run cost Cbk of using bulbs with kerosene to avoid
blackouts. As evident from Figure 4(c), the consumption process renews after every bulb recharge. Therefore,
a cycle constitutes one sub-cycle where bulb is used, and nˆ sub-cycles where kerosene is used. Here, nˆ is the
smallest n satisfying Mn ≥ P . To simplify the analysis, we approximate integral nˆ as a real number. Then
nˆ=
log(P/M0)
log(1−α+αγ) ,
where γ = µ/(λpk). Recall that γ > 1. The length of a single cycle, given by the sum of its sub-cycle lengths,
is
Q
λ
+
αM0
λpk
+
αM1
λpk
+ · · ·+ αMnˆ−1
λpk
=
Q
λ
+
P/µ−Q/λ
1− 1/γ .
Since blackouts are completely avoided in this case, the blackout cost in a cycle is zero. The total inconve-
nience incurred in a cycle is the sum of inconvenience I in recharging the bulb once, and inconvenience Ik
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in purchasing kerosene nˆ times, i.e., I + nˆIk. The monetary cost incurred in a cycle is the sum of amounts
paid to recharge the bulb once and to purchase kerosene in the subsequent nˆ sub-cycles. It is given by
P +αM0 +αM1 + · · ·+αMnˆ−1 = P + P −µQ/λ
γ− 1 .
Then the long-run cost, which is the total cost incurred in a cycle divided by the cycle length, is given by
Cbk =
I + nˆIk +P +
P−µQ/λ
γ−1
Q
λ
+ P/µ−Q/λ
1−1/γ
.
If consumer uses only kerosene, then the resultant long-run cost is Ck = (Ik+pkQk)/(Qk/λ) = µ/γ+Ikλ/Qk,
where Qk is the quantity of kerosene that consumer chooses to purchase in every cycle. Now, note that
Cbk >µ/γ, which follows from(
I + nˆIk +P +
P −µQ/λ
γ− 1
)
γ−
(
Q
λ
+
P/µ−Q/λ
1− 1/γ
)
µ
= (I + nˆIk)γ+Pγ−µQ/λ > (I + nˆIk)γ+P −µQ/λ > 0.
Since Cbk−Ck = (Cbk−µ/γ)− Ikλ/Qk, by setting Qk > Ikλ/(Cb−µ/γ)> 0, we obtain Cbk >Ck. 
Proof of Lemma 5. The result follows if we show that C∗k is increasing in pk. Here, we use the notation
from Proposition 1. By envelope theorem, we have
∂C∗k
∂pk
=
∂Ck
∂pk
∣∣∣∣
Q∗
k
=
∂
(
pk/Ψˆk
)
∂pk
+
1
Q∗k
∂
∂pk
{
I +βBk
Ψˆk
}∣∣∣∣
Q∗
k
,
where the first term is positive because pk/Ψˆk is increasing in pk. The sign of the second term depends on
Ψˆk
∂βBk
∂pk
∣∣∣∣
Q∗
k
− ∂Ψˆk
∂pk
(I +βBk)|Q∗
k
=
[
1
λ
+
∫ ∞
ρk
(
pkε
µ
− 1
λ
)
dF (ε)
]
∂βBk
∂pk
∣∣∣∣
Q∗
k
− ∂Ψˆk
∂pk
β(Hk +Bk)|Q∗
k
≥ β
∫ ∞
ρk
pkε
µ
dF (ε)
∫ ∞
ρk
Q∗kε
µ
b′(Q∗kz)dF (ε)−β
∫ ∞
ρk
ε
µ
dF (ε)
∫ ∞
ρk
Q∗kzb
′(Q∗kz)dF (ε)
= β
∫ ∞
ρk
ε
µ
dF (ε)
∫ ∞
ρk
Q∗k
λ
b′(Q∗kz)dF (ε) ≥ 0,
where the first step follows because I = βHk at the optimum Q
∗
k (see Proposition 1), the second step follows
because Bk is increasing in pk and Hk +Bk =
∫∞
ρk
Qkzb
′(Qkz)dF (ε) where z = pkε/µ−1/λ, and the last step
follows because b is increasing. 
Lemma A.1. If b(z) = z2, then the zeros of ∆ are given by
√
I0 = xψ
(√
βBˆk
Ψˆk
−
√
δ
)
and
√
I1 = xψ
(√
βBˆk
Ψˆk
+
√
δ
)
, (21)
where
δ = β
(
Bˆk
Ψˆ2k
− ξ
ψ2
)
+
1
xψ
(
pk
Ψˆk
− 1
ψ
)
, ξ =
∫ ∞
µq
λ
(
ε
µ
− q
λ
)2
dF (ε), and Bˆk =
∫ ∞
µ
λpk
(
pkε
µ
− 1
λ
)2
dF (ε).
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Proof of Lemma A.1. We first obtain the optimal kerosene cost in closed form by rewriting Ck as
Ck =
pk
Ψˆk
+
1
Ψˆk
(
I
Qk
+βQkBˆk
)
.
The term in parentheses is a convex function of Qk, so it follows that
Q∗k =
√
I
βBˆk
and C∗k =
pk
Ψˆk
+
2
√
IβBˆk
Ψˆk
. (22)
Using (22), we can now rewrite (8) as
∆ =
I +x+βx2ξ
xψ
−
(
pk
Ψˆk
+
2
√
IβBˆk
Ψˆk
)
.
Then ∆ = 0 is a quadratic equation in
√
I. Its solutions are given by (21), and δ is the determinant of this
equation. 
Lemma A.2. Let g and G be the PDF and the CDF, respectively, of a positive random variable Z such that
zg′(z)/g(z) and zg(z)/G(z) are decreasing in z. Call this property (P).
(i) Random variable Y such that Z = uY v also satisfies property (P) for all u> 0 and v > 0.
(ii) The gamma, log-normal, Erlang, chi-squared, chi, Weibull, exponential, power-law, and uniform distri-
butions satisfy property (P).
Proof of Lemma A.2.
(i) Let h and H be (respectively) the PDF and CDF of Y . Then we can use the definition of Y to obtain
H(y) = Pr(Y ≤ y) = Pr(Z ≤ uyv) =G(uyv),
which in turn yields h(y) = uvyv−1g(uyv) and h′(y) = uv(v − 1)yv−2g(uyv) + u2v2y2(v−1)g′(uyv). It follows
that
yh′(y)
h(y)
= v− 1 + vuy
vg′(uyv)
g(uyv)
and
yh(y)
H(y)
= v
uyvg(uyv)
G(uyv)
.
Given that uyv is an increasing function of y, the result is a direct consequence of Z satisfying (P).
(ii) For a gamma distribution with rate parameter r and shape parameter s, we have
zg′(z)
g(z)
= s− 1− rz and zg(z)
G(z)
=
(rz)se−rz
γ(s, rz)
,
where γ(s, rz) =
∫ rz
0
ts−1e−t dt is the incomplete gamma function (Johnson et al. 1995). The function
zg′(z)/g(z) is trivially decreasing in z. The function zg(z)/G(z) is also decreasing in z because its deriva-
tive, rszs−1e−rz[(s− rz)γ − (rz)se−rz]/γ2, is always negative; this follows because the term in brackets is
decreasing in z (its derivative is −rγ(s, rz)≤ 0) and its value at z = 0 is zero. Since the exponential, Erlang,
and chi-squared distributions are all special cases of the gamma distribution (Johnson et al. 1995), they also
satisfy property (P).
Since the chi random variable is the square root of chi-squared random variable and the Weibull random
variable W is equal to sZ1/q where Z is the standard exponential random variable, s and q, are respectively,
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the scale and shape parameters of W (Johnson et al. 1995), it follows from part (i) that both the chi and
the Weibull also satisfy property (P).
For the log-normal distribution, g(z) = φ(log z)/z and G(z) = Φ(log z), where φ and Φ are (respectively) the
PDF and the CDF of the standard normal distribution (Johnson et al. 1995). Therefore,
zg′(z)
g(z)
=−(1 + log z) and zg(z)
G(z)
=
φ(z)
Φ(z)
.
The former function is trivially decreasing in z. The latter is decreasing in z because its derivative,
−φ(z)[zΦ(z) +φ(z)]/Φ(z)2, is always negative; the reason is that the term in brackets is increasing in z (its
derivative is Φ(z)≥ 0) and its value at z = 0 is φ(0). For the power-law distribution with parameter c such
that g(z) = czc−1, both zg(z)/G(z) and zg′(z)/g(z) are constants (and equal to c and c− 1, respectively).
The uniform distribution trivially satisfies property (P). 
Proof of Proposition 3. It is easy to verify that δ defined in Lemma A.1 is decreasing in x, and x2δ is
increasing in x.
(i) This result follows once we note that the terms in parentheses in the expressions for
√
I0 and
√
I1 in (21)
are positive and increasing in x. (Note that if pk ≥ P/Q then Bˆk/Ψˆ2 ≥ ξ/ψ2.)
(ii) First, observe that
I1− I0 = 4ψ2x
√
βBˆk
Ψˆk
√
x2δ and
I0
I1
=

√
βBˆk
/
Ψˆk−
√
δ√
βBˆk
/
Ψˆk +
√
δ

2
.
The first function above is increasing in x because x2δ is increasing in x, and the second is increasing in x
because δ is decreasing in x. So now we have that
∂I0/∂x
∂I1/∂x
=
√
I0
I1

√
βBˆk
/
Ψˆk− ∂
√
x2δ/∂x√
βBˆk
/
Ψˆk + ∂
√
x2δ/∂x

is increasing in x because:
∂2
√
x2δ
∂x2
=
−(pk/Ψˆk− 1/ψ)2
4ψ2(x2δ)3/2
< 0,
the term in brackets is positive (from part (i)), and I0/I1 is increasing in x. Also, g(I0)/g(I1) is increasing
in x because
∂
∂x
(
g(I0)
g(I1)
)
=
g(I0)
g(I1)
{(
g′(I0)
g(I0)
− g
′(I1)
g(I1)
)
∂I0
∂x
− g
′(I1)
g(I1)
(
∂I1
∂x
− ∂I0
∂x
)}
≥ g(I0)
g(I1)
(
∂(I1− I0)/∂x
I1− I0
){
g′(I0)I0
g(I0)
− g
′(I1)I1
g(I1)
}
≥ 0.
The first inequality follows because g′/g is decreasing and I0/I1 is increasing in x, from which it follows
that (I1− I0)∂I0/∂x≥ I0∂(I1− I0)/∂x. The second inequality follows because zg′(z)/G(z) is decreasing and
I1− I0 is increasing in x.
Next we use the preceding results to show that demand D is unimodal in x. Note that I0 > 0 is equivalent to
x> xβ for xβ =ψ(pk/Ψˆk−1/ψ)/(βξ). Then, for x≤ xβ, we have that D=G(I1) is increasing in x. Otherwise,
D=G(I1)−G(I0) and its derivative w.r.t. x is
∂D
∂x
= g(I1)
∂I1
∂x
[
1− g(I0)
g(I1)
∂I0/∂x
∂I1/∂x
]
≡ g(I1)∂I1
∂x
[
1−h(x)].
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We can see that h(x) increases with x. Also, limx→xβ h(x) = 0 and limx→∞ h(x) =∞. Therefore, the function
1−h(x) is decreasing in x and crosses the x-axis exactly once from above, which yields a unimodal D. 
Proof of Lemma 6.
(i) First note the following properties w.r.t. bulb capacity Q: Long-run inconvenience and monetary costs
decrease with Q because, by Lemma 1(ii), cycle length increases with Q. Since B is decreasing in Q, Ψ is
increasing in Q, and both B and Ψ are positive, it follows that their ratio (and hence the long-run blackout
cost) is decreasing in Q. Now recall that varying capacity-price ratio q at fixed scale x is equivalent varying Q
at fixed recharge price P . Therefore, all the above properties also hold w.r.t. q.
(ii) Because Ij (j ∈ {0,1}) are zeros of ∆, we can use the implicit function theorem and write
∂Ij
∂q
=−∂∆/∂q
∂∆/∂I
∣∣∣∣
Ij
.
The result then follows by noting that ∆ decreases with q (since, by part (i), C decreases with q) and that
∆ is downward sloping (resp., upward sloping) at I0 (resp., at I1).
(iii) The derivative of demand w.r.t. q is
∂D
∂q
= g(I1)
∂I1
∂q
− g(I0)∂I0
∂q
.
The result now follows easily from part (ii). 
Lemma A.3. Let i0 =
√
I0 and i1 =
√
I1. If b(z) = z
2, then:
(i) ψ/i1 is U-shaped in q;
(ii) ∂i1/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
is decreasing in q; and
(iii) −ψ ∂i0/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
is decreasing in q.
Proof of Lemma A.3.
(i) By (21), i1/ψ= x
(√
βBˆk
/
Ψˆk+
√
δ
)
. Therefore, it is enough to show that δ is unimodal in q. Its derivative
w.r.t. q is given by
∂δ
∂q
=
1
ψ2
∂ψ
∂q
(
−β ∂ξ/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
+
2βξ
ψ
+
2
xψ
− pk
xΨˆk
)
.
We can easily verify that ∂ξ/∂q is negative and increasing in q whereas ∂ψ/∂q is positive and increasing
in q. Therefore, − ∂ξ/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
is decreasing in q. Since ξ/ψ and 1/ψ are also decreasing in q (by Lemma 6), the
term in parentheses decreases with q. At q= 1/pk (which is the minimum possible capacity-price ratio), this
term takes a positive value because 1/ψ= pk/Ψˆk. Its limit as q→∞ is −pk/(xΨˆk)< 0 and so it crosses the
x-axis only once from above, which renders δ unimodal.
(ii) Using the expression for i1 from (21), we have
∂i1/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
= x
√
βBˆk
Ψˆk
− βx
2ψ
√
δ
∂ξ/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
+
x
2
√
δ
{
2βBˆk
Ψˆ2k
+
pk
xψΨˆk
}
.
The first term on the right-hand side (RHS) is independent of q whereas the second term is decreasing in q
because, as argued in part (i), − ∂ξ/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
is positive and decreasing in q while ψ
√
δ is positive and increasing
in q. The third term is also decreasing in q because its derivative w.r.t. q is
x
4δ
√
δ
{
− 1
x2ψ3
∂ψ
∂q
(
pk
Ψˆk
)2
+
β
ψ2
∂ξ
∂q
(
2βBˆk
Ψˆ2k
+
pk
xψΨˆk
)
− 4βBˆk
Ψˆ2k
∂ψ
∂q
(1 +βxξ)
xψ3
}
≤ 0.
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(iii) Recall from (9) that i0 exists only when β > βˆ. When this inequality holds, it is easy to verify that δ
increases with q. Using the expression for i0 from (21), we obtain
−ψ∂i0
∂q
=
1
2
√
δ
{
xψ2
∂δ
∂q
+ 2xδψ
∂ψ
∂q
−
2
√
βBˆk
Ψˆk
∂ψ
∂q
xψ
√
δ
}
=
1
2
√
δ
{
pk
Ψˆk
∂ψ
∂q
−βx∂ξ
∂q
+
2
√
βBˆk
Ψˆk
∂ψ
∂q
i0
}
.
The term in braces is positive and, when divided by ∂ψ/∂q, is decreasing in q; the reason is that i0 and
− ∂ξ/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
are both decreasing in q. Thus −ψ ∂i0/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
is the ratio of positive decreasing function and positive
increasing function and so is decreasing in q. 
Lemma A.4. Let g and G be the PDF and CDF (respectively) of a positive random variable such that
hazard rate g(z)/(1−G(z)) is increasing in z and the function zg(z)/G(z) is decreasing in z. Then:
(i) G(z) is log-concave in z;
(ii) (α−G(z))g′(z) + g(z)2 ≥ 0 for 0≤ α≤ 1; and
(iii) (α−G(z))(zg′(z) + g(z)) + zg(z)2 ≥ 0 for 0≤ α≤ 1.
Proof of Lemma A.4.
(i) This follows by noting that the log-concavity of G(z) is equivalent to decreasing g(z)/G(z).
(ii) That the hazard rate is increasing in z yields (1 − G(z))g′(z) + g(z)2 ≥ 0, whereas the log-concavity
of CDF yields G(z)g′(z) − g(z)2 ≤ 0. For z such that g′(z) ≤ 0, we have (α − G(z))g′(z) + g(z)2 ≥ (1 −
G(z))g′(z) + g(z)2 ≥ 0 because α≤ 1. Similarly, for z satisfying g′(z)> 0 we have (α−G(z))g′(z) + g(z)2 ≥
−G(z)g′(z) + g(z)2 ≥ 0 because α≥ 0. As a consequence, the result is valid for all z.
(iii) Given our assumption on zg(z)/G(z), it follows that (zg′(z) + g(z))G(z)− zg(z)2 ≤ 0. By the increasing
hazard rate property, (1−G(z))(zg′(z) + g(z)) + zg(z)2 ≥ 0. On the one hand, if z satisfies the inequality
zg′(z) + g(z) ≤ 0 then (α−G(z))(zg′(z) + g(z)) + zg(z)2 ≥ (1−G(z))(zg′(z) + g(z)) + zg(z)2 ≥ 0 because
α ≤ 1. On the other hand, if z is such that zg′(z) + g(z) > 0 then (α − G(z))(zg′(z) + g(z)) + zg(z)2 ≥
−G(z)(zg′(z) + g(z)) + zg(z)2 ≥ 0 because α≥ 0. Hence the result holds for all z. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The derivative of revenue w.r.t. q is
∂R
∂q
=
1
ψ2
(
ψ
∂D
∂q
−D∂ψ
∂q
)
=
D
ψ2
∂ψ
∂q
(
ψ
D
∂D/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
− 1
)
≡ D
ψ2
∂ψ
∂q
(
h(q)− 1).
We can use (9) to translate the condition β > (≤) βˆ into q < (≥) qβ for some unique qβ. Then, for q < qβ, we
have D=G(I1)−G(I0). Let i0 =
√
I0 and i1 =
√
I1. We can now rewrite h(q) as
h(q) = 2
[
I1g(I1)
G(I1)−G(I0)
][
∂i1/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
][
ψ
i1
]
+ 2
[
g(I0)
G(I1)−G(I0)
][
−ψ∂i0/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
]
[i0].
It now follows from Lemmas A.3 and A.4 that each term in brackets is positive and also decreasing in q.
Therefore, h(q) is also decreasing in q for q < qβ.
If q≥ qβ then D=G(I1). By Lemma A.3(i), ψ/i1 is U-shaped in q; we use q to denote the minimum of this
function. (One can easily verify that q > qβ.) Then, for q≥ qβ, we have
h(q) = 2
[
I1g(I1)
G(I1)
][
∂i1/∂q
∂ψ/∂q
][
ψ
i1
]
.
Since the domain extends only up to q, it follows that all the terms in brackets are both positive and
decreasing in q; therefore, h(q) is decreasing in
[
q, q
]
. Moreover, limq→q h(q) =∞ and so h(q)− 1 crosses the
x-axis at most once (from above); hence R is unimodal in this domain. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. Put ρ=Qµ/(λP ).
(i) This claim follows from Lemma 1(ii).
(ii) The results w.r.t. µ follow from Lemma 1(ii). The term P/Ψ is increasing in P because
∂(P/Ψ)
∂P
=
1
Ψ2
{
Ψ−P ∂Ψ
∂P
}
=
Q
λΨ2
F (ρ)≥ 0.
(iii) First note that the shape of βB/Ψ is same as that of B/Ψ. The derivative of latter w.r.t. P is given by
∂(B/Ψ)
∂P
=
1
Ψ2
{
Ψ
∂B
∂P
−B∂Ψ
∂P
}
.
The term in braces can alternatively be written as[
Q
λ
+
∫ ∞
ρ
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
dF (ε)
]
∂B
∂P
−B∂Ψ
∂P
=
Q
λ
F (ρ)
∂B
∂P
+
∫ ∞
ρ
Pε
µ
dF (ε)
∂B
∂P
−B∂Ψ
∂P
≥
∫ ∞
ρ
Pε
µ
dF (ε)
∫ ∞
ρ
b′
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
ε
µ
dF (ε)−
∫ ∞
ρ
b
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
dF (ε)
∫ ∞
ρ
ε
µ
dF (ε)
=
∫ ∞
ρ
ε
µ
dF (ε)
{∫ ∞
ρ
[
b′
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
Pε
µ
− b
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)]
dF (ε)
}
≥ 0.
The first inequality follows from Lemma 1(i). The last inequality follows by noting that the term in brackets
is always positive for any given ε because its derivative w.r.t. P is b′′(Pε/µ−Q/λ)P (ε/µ)2 ≥ 0 and its value
at the lowest feasible P =Qµ/(λε) is b′(0)Q/λ≥ 0.
The result w.r.t. µ follows immediately from the result w.r.t. P because P and µ co-occur in the expression
for B/Ψ, with P in the numerator and µ in the denominator. 
Proof of Remark 1. Let ρ=Qµ/(λP ). We first prove the following two inequalities, which are then used
to establish the main result:
∂3B
∂P 3
∂2Ψ
∂P 2
− ∂
3Ψ
∂P 3
∂2B
∂P 2
≥ 0; (23)
∂2B
∂P 2
∂Ψ
∂P
− ∂
2Ψ
∂P 2
∂B
∂P
≥ 0. (24)
We prove (23) for m > 3; it can easily be proved also for m = 2 and m = 3. We have b′(z) = mzm−1,
b′′(z) =m(m− 1)zm−2, and b′′′(z) =m(m− 1)(m− 2)zm−3. Now the combination of (15) and (16) yield
∂2Ψ
∂P 2
=
ρ2
µP
f(ρ),
∂3Ψ
∂P 3
=− ρ
2
µP 2
(3f(ρ) + ρf ′(ρ)),
∂2B
∂P 2
=
∫ ∞
ρ
b′′
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
ε2
µ2
f(ε)dε,
∂3B
∂P 3
=
∫ ∞
ρ
b′′′
(
Pε
µ
− Q
λ
)
ε3
µ3
f(ε)dε.
Then
∂3B
∂P 3
∂2Ψ
∂P 2
− ∂
3Ψ
∂P 3
∂2B
∂P 2
≥m(m− 1)ρ
2f(ρ)
µ3P 2
(
Q
λρ
)m−2 ∫ ∞
ρ
{
(m− 2)(ε− ρ)m−3ε3 +
(
1 +
ρf ′(ρ)
f(ρ)
)
(ε− ρ)m−2ε2
}
f(ε)dε
≥m(m− 1)ρ
2f(ρ)
µ3P 2
(
Q
λρ
)m−2 ∫ ∞
ρ
{
(m− 2)(ε− ρ)m−3ε3 +
(
1 +
ρf ′(ε)
f(ε)
)
(ε− ρ)m−2ε2
}
f(ε)dε;
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here the first inequality follows because 3f(ρ)≥ f(ρ), and the second inequality follows from the log-concavity
of f (i.e., f ′/f is decreasing). It is sufficient to show that the integral on the RHS is positive. This integral
can be rewritten as ρV (ρ), where V (ρ) = I1(ρ) + I2(ρ) + I3(ρ) for
I1(ρ) =
1
ρ
∫ ∞
ρ
(m− 2)(ε− ρ)m−3ε3f(ε)dε, I2(ρ) = 1
ρ
∫ ∞
ρ
(ε− ρ)m−2ε2f(ε)dε,
and I3(ρ) =
∫ ∞
ρ
(ε− ρ)m−2ε2f ′(ε)dε.
Using induction, one can easily verify that
∂m−1I3
∂ρm−1
= (−1)m−1(m− 2)!ρ2f ′(ρ)
and that, for 1≤ k <m,
∂kI1
∂ρk
=−k
ρ
∂k−1I1
∂ρk−1
+
(−1)k
ρ
∫ ∞
ρ
(m− 2) · · · (m− k− 2)(ε− ρ)m−k−3ε3f(ε)dε =⇒ (−1)k ∂
kI1
∂ρk
≥ 0,
∂kI2
∂ρk
=−k
ρ
∂k−1I2
∂ρk−1
+
(−1)k
ρ
∫ ∞
ρ
(m− 2) · · · (m− k− 1)(ε− ρ)m−k−2ε2f(ε)dε =⇒ (−1)k ∂
kI2
∂ρk
≥ 0.
Then we have
∂m−1V
∂ρm−1
=−m− 3
ρ3
∂m−4
∂ρm−4
(I1 + I2) +
m− 3
ρ2
∂m−3
∂ρm−3
(I1 + I2) +
4
ρ3
(−1)m−1
∫ ∞
ρ
(m− 2)!ε3f(ε)dε.
If m is even (resp., odd), then ∂
m−1V
∂ρm−1 is less than (resp., greater than) zero. Given that limρ→∞
∂kV
∂ρk
= 0 for
1≤ k <m, we infer that (−1)k ∂kV
∂ρk
≥ 0. Hence V (ρ) is decreasing in ρ with limρ→∞ V (ρ) = 0, which yields
the desired result.
To prove (24), we first write ∂B/∂P = v(∂Ψ/∂P ), where v is an increasing convex function (and v(0) = 0).
This relationship follows from (23) and Theorem 1 of Pratt (1964). Then
∂2B
∂P 2
∂Ψ
∂P
− ∂
2Ψ
∂P 2
∂B
∂P
=
∂2Ψ
∂P 2
{
v′
(
∂Ψ
∂P
)
∂Ψ
∂P
− v
(
∂Ψ
∂P
)}
≥ 0
because Ψ is convex in P and v′(z)z− v(z)≥ 0 for z ≥ 0.
Now we are ready to prove the main result.
(i) Put ν = 1/µ. Since ν behaves similarly to P in the expressions for B and Ψ, it follows that – much as
in (24) – we have
∂2B
∂ν2
∂Ψ
∂ν
− ∂
2Ψ
∂ν2
∂B
∂ν
≥ 0.
Then
∂2B
∂µ2
∂Ψ
∂µ
− ∂
2Ψ
∂µ2
∂B
∂µ
=
(
∂2B
∂ν2
∂Ψ
∂ν
− ∂
2Ψ
∂ν2
∂B
∂ν
)(
∂ν
∂µ
)3
≤ 0. (25)
The derivative of C w.r.t. µ is given by
∂C
∂µ
=
∂Ψ/∂µ
Ψ2
{
− (I +P ) +βΨ(∂B/∂µ)−B(∂Ψ/∂µ)
∂Ψ/∂µ
}
≡ ∂Ψ/∂µ
Ψ2
{−(I +P ) +βl(µ)}.
By taking the derivative of l(µ) w.r.t. µ, it is easy to see from (25) that l(µ) is decreasing in µ. Because
limµ→0 l(µ) =∞ and limµ→∞ l(µ) = 0, the term in braces is decreasing in µ and crosses the x-axis once from
above. Since ∂Ψ/∂µ≤ 0, it follows that C is U-shaped in µ.
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(ii) The derivative of C w.r.t. P is given by
∂C
∂P
=
∂Ψ/∂P
Ψ2
[
− I + Ψ−P (∂Ψ/∂P )
∂Ψ/∂P
+β
Ψ(∂B/∂P )−B(∂Ψ/∂P )
∂Ψ/∂P
]
≡ ∂Ψ/∂P
Ψ2
[−I +h(P )]. (26)
Our aim is to show that h(P ) is U-shaped in P . First, we have
∂h
∂P
=
Ψ
(∂Ψ/∂P )2
(
∂2B
∂P 2
∂Ψ
∂P
− ∂
2Ψ
∂P 2
∂B
∂P
)
{β− r(P )} for r(P ) =
∂2Ψ
∂P2
∂2B
∂P2
∂Ψ
∂P
− ∂2Ψ
∂P2
∂B
∂P
. (27)
Next, from (24) it follows that the sign of ∂h/∂P depends only on the sign of the term in braces (i.e., of
β − r(P )). By taking the derivative of r(P ) w.r.t. P , one can easily see from (23) that r(P ) is decreasing
in P . Since limP→0 r(P ) =∞ and since limP→∞ r(P ) = 0, it follows that the term in braces in (27) crosses the
x-axis once from below, which yields a U-shaped h(P ). Now observe that limP→0 h(P ) = limP→∞ h(P ) =∞,
and let Iˆ = minP h(P ). By (26) we see that, if I ≤ Iˆ, then the derivative is completely positive and C is
increasing in P . Otherwise, the derivative crosses the x-axis twice – first from above and then from below –
and so C is N-shaped. 
Proof of Lemma 7. After setting ρ=Qµ/(λP ), we can rewrite Ln as follows:
Ln =
P
µ
E[e˜n− ρ]+ = P
µ
(
Ee˜n− ρ+E[ρ− e˜n]+
)
.
Because e˜n is a mean-preserving spread of e˜n+1, we can use Definition 1.5.1 of Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002)
to write e˜n ≤icv e˜n+1 or, equivalently, −e˜n+1 ≤icx −e˜n. Using their Theorem 1.5.7(ii), we now deduce that
E[ρ− e˜n+1]+ ≤ E[ρ− e˜n]+. Since Ee˜n = Eε˜ for all n, it follows that Ln+1 ≤ Ln. Given this inequality, from
Theorem 1.5.7(i) of Mu¨ller and Stoyan (2002) we obtain e˜n+1 ≤icx e˜n. Since b(P [z− ρ]+/µ) is an increasing
convex function in z, it follows that Bn+1 ≤Bn. 
Lemma A.5. In (10), ∆ is U-shaped in I. Let ∆m be the minimum value of ∆. Then – for any given µ, λ,
P, Q, and pk – there exists a threshold ζ ≥ 0 such that ∆m ≤ (>) 0 if P/Q≤ (>)pk(1 + ζ).
Proof of Lemma A.5. We first characterize the optimal cost with bulbs and kerosene. Then we describe
the shape and minimum value of ∆.
Optimal cost with bulbs. The unconstrained minimization of C(T ) = (I+P +β(T −Q/λ)2)/T w.r.t. T yields
the optimal cycle length T ∗ and optimal cost C(T ∗):
T ∗ =
√(
Q
λ
)2
+
I +P
β
; C(T ∗) = 2β
(
T ∗− Q
λ
)
.
We require that the cycle length be greater than P/µ, so if T ∗ > P/µ then the optimal cost is C(T ∗);
otherwise, it is C(P/µ). We can rewrite the condition T ∗ ≤ (>)P/µ as I ≤ (>) Iˆ, where the threshold
Iˆ = β[(P/µ)2− (Q/λ)2]−P .
Optimal cost with kerosene. The Lagrangian for the constrained optimization of Ck(Qk, Tk) in (10) is given
by
L(Qk, Tk, χ1, χ2) =Ck(Qk, Tk)−χ1(Tk− pkQk/λ)−χ2(QkM −Tk).
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Any local minimum satisfies the following Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions:
∂Ck
∂Qk
+
χ1pk
λ
−χ2M = 0, ∂Ck
∂Tk
−χ1 +χ2 = 0, χ1
(
Tk− pkQk
λ
)
= 0, χ2(QkM −Tk) = 0,
Tk ≥ pkQk
λ
, QkM ≥ Tk, Qk ≥ 0, Tk ≥ 0, χ1 ≥ 0, χ2 ≥ 0.
We consider three cases as follows.
1. χ1 = χ2 = 0. This case is not possible because the equations ∂Ck/∂Qk = 0 and ∂Ck/∂Tk = 0 are incon-
sistent.
2. χ1 = 0 and χ2 > 0. This case results in the optimal values Qk = 0 and Tk = 0, which lead to infinite
cost.
3. χ1 > 0 and χ2 = 0. This case simply reduces to optimizing Ck w.r.t. Qk, with Tk = pkQk/µ; it is the
deterministic version of the problem considered in Section 3.2. Since the corresponding optimal cost is
finite, it follows that this is the only feasible solution. The optimal solution is given by
Q∗k =
1
Lk
√
I
β
, T ∗k =
pkQ
∗
k
µ
, and C∗k = µ+
2µLk
pk
√
Iβ for Lk =
pk
µ
− 1
λ
.
Shape of ∆. First we suppose that Iˆ > 0, in which case P/µ>Q/λ. It follows that ∆ is equal to ∆< for I ≤ Iˆ
or is equal to ∆> for I > Iˆ; here
∆< =
I +P +β(P/µ−Q/λ)2
P/µ
−µ− 2µLk
pk
√
Iβ and ∆> = 2β(T
∗−Q/λ)−µ− 2µLk
pk
√
Iβ. (28)
Note that ∆ is continuous at Iˆ. The corresponding derivatives w.r.t. I are given by
∂∆<
∂I
=
µ
P
− µLk
pk
√
β
I
and
∂∆>
∂I
=
1√
I
{√
I
(Q/λ)2 + (I +P )/β
− µLk
pk
√
β
}
. (29)
Since ∂∆</∂I is increasing in I, ∂∆>/∂I crosses the x-axis at most once from below (because the term
in braces is increasing in I), and limI→Iˆ ∂∆</∂I = limI→Iˆ ∂∆>/∂I, it follows that ∂∆/∂I also crosses the
x-axis at most once from below. Finally, since limI→0 ∂∆</∂I < 0 and limI→∞ ∂∆>/∂I = 0 (from above,
since the term in braces in (29) is positive as I →∞), ∂∆/∂I crosses the x-axis exactly once and so ∆ is
U-shaped in I.
Now we consider the case when Iˆ ≤ 0; then ∆ = ∆> for all I. Because limI→0 ∂∆>/∂I < 0 and
limI→∞ ∂∆>/∂I = 0 (from above), ∆ is again U-shaped in I.
Minimum value of ∆. As before, we first consider the case Iˆ > 0. Let ∆m denote the minimum value of ∆,
which is achieved at Im. Since ∆ has only one minimum, it is either from ∆< or ∆> depending on the sign
of limI→Iˆ ∂∆/∂I.
On the one hand, if limI→Iˆ ∂∆/∂I ≥ 0, then Im is obtained by setting ∂∆</∂I = 0. It follows from (28)
and (29) that ∆m is given by
∆m = Im
(
µ
P
− µLk
pk
√
β
Im
)
+βµP
(
(P/µ−Q/λ)2
P 2
− L
2
k
p2k
)
.
By (29), the first term is equal to zero – and the second term is less than zero – iff P/Q≤ pk.
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On the other hand, if limI→Iˆ ∂∆/∂I < 0 then Im is obtained by setting ∂∆>/∂I = 0. We can now use (28)
and (29) to obtain
∆m = 2β
√[
1−
(
µLk
pk
)2][(
Q
λ
)2
+
P
β
]
− 2βQ
λ
−µ.
Then ∆m ≤ 0 iff
P
Q
<
βQ
λ2
(
µLk
pk
)2
+ µ
2
4βQ
+ µ
λ
1− (µLk
pk
)2 = pk
{
βQ
µλ
(
µLk
pk
)2
+ µλ
4βQ
+ 1
2− µ
λpk
}
. (30)
The term in the braces is greater than one because
βQ
µλ
(
µLk
pk
)2
+
µλ
4βQ
− 1 + µ
λpk
≥ 2
√
β
µλ
(
µLk
pk
)2
µλ
4β
− 1 + µ
λpk
= 0.
We can therefore rewrite the term in braces in (30) as 1 + ζ for some ζ ≥ 0, so the condition in (30) reduces
to P/Q≤ pk(1 + ζ).
Finally, we consider the case Iˆ ≤ 0; then ∆ = ∆> for all I. It follows that ∆m ≤ 0 iff P/Q≤ pk(1 + ζ). So in
all possible cases (as just described), ∆m ≤ 0 if and only if P/Q≤ pk(1 + ζ) for some ζ ≥ 0. 
Lemma A.6. Under deterministic income model with b(z) = z2, both I0 and I1 are increasing in ν (= 1/µ)
for ν ∈ (ν,∞), where ν = max{Q/(λP ),1/(λpk)}.
Proof of Lemma A.6. First note that under our model, saving rate µ affects the long-run cost only through
blackouts. Therefore, we analyze the impact of µ on preferences when consumer experiences blackouts with
both bulbs and kerosene. Under deterministic income setting, this is true when P/µ>Q/λ and pk/µ> 1/λ,
i.e., µ < min{λP/Q,λpk}, or equivalently ν > ν = max{Q/(λP ),1/(λpk)}. (It is important to note that it
may not even be realistic to analyze preferences with high values of µ because the corresponding consumers
do not qualify as poor, and they are unlikely to face a choice between using bulbs and using kerosene.) Then,
we have
∆ =
I +P +β(Pν−Q/λ)2
Pν
−
{
1
ν
+ 2
√
Iβ
(
1− 1
λpkν
)}
.
The second term above in braces is the optimal kerosene cost obtained in closed form for b(z) = z2 (see proof
of Lemma A.5). The zeros of ∆ with respect to I are given by√
I0 = P
√
β
(
ν− 1
λpk
)
−√η and
√
I1 = P
√
β
(
ν− 1
λpk
)
+
√
η, (31)
where
η= β
(
Q
λ
− P
λpk
)(
2Pν− Q
λ
− P
λpk
)
. (32)
Because P/Q< pk (which is necessary for the existence of zeros I0 and I1), η is increasing in ν. Therefore,
I1 is increasing in ν. I0 is also increasing in ν because
∂
√
I0
∂ν
=
P√
η
√(
Q
λ
− P
λpk
){√(
2Pν− Q
λ
− P
λpk
)
−
√(
Q
λ
− P
λpk
)}
> 0,
which follows by noting that Pν >Q/λ. 
